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Women, Rule-Breaking, and
The Triple Bind
June Carbone,* Naomi Cahn** & Nancy Levit***
ABSTRACT
Two growing literatures critique Hobbesian corporate cultures. Manage-
ment analyses document the way high-stakes/zero-sum bonus systems under-
mine, rather than enhance, productivity as they subvert teamwork, valorize
self-interested behavior, and weaken ethical standards. This literature treats
negative effects of such systems, including lawless and unethical behavior, as
the unintended consequences of efforts to shake up complacent institutions or
replace an insular old guard with an ambitious and meritocratic new
workforce. A second, darker literature terms such Hobbesian environments
“masculinities contests” that select for those executives who best exemplify
masculine traits such as a single-minded focus on professional success, physi-
cal strength, and the willingness to engage in no-holds-barred competition.
This literature treats the rule-breaking environment that results as an inciden-
tal byproduct of the way that such cultures valorize masculine traits. Drawing
on insights from criminology, psychology, and feminist theory, this Article
suggests another possibility: that certain management cultures intentionally de-
sign the competitions to facilitate breaking the rules with impunity.
In a Hobbesian world, where some profit handsomely from defying con-
vention, zero-sum competitions play a role that extends beyond valorizing al-
pha males. They select for leaders who will lie, shortchange their families, and
break the law to get results—and do so without explicit orders that might sub-
ject upper management to accountability for the practices. In such a world,
women fall behind not necessarily because of misogyny, though such environ-
ments often breed it. Instead, they lose because of a triple bind. First, women
cannot prevail in such competitions unless they can outmaneuver men, credi-
bly display greater devotion to the job, or more brazenly flout the laws. Sec-
ond, they are disproportionately disliked and punished for displaying the self-
centered, rule-breaking behavior of men. Third, women become less likely to
seek positions because they correctly perceive that they could not thrive and
are more likely than men to decide they do not wish to do so on such terms,
reinforcing the male-identified character of such environments. Where these
companies’ business models depend not just on the ability to upend traditional
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1106 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1105
practices, but to break the law, the companies cannot address gender dispari-
ties without addressing the business model itself. The Article concludes that
gender inequality is intrinsically intertwined with the evisceration of the rule of
law in corporate America.
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INTRODUCTION
Zoe Cruz was one of the most powerful and highly paid women
on Wall Street.1 Many people thought she was being groomed to be
the next head of Morgan Stanley, one of the most prominent New
York investment banking firms.2 By 2005, she had backed the winning
side in a management shake-up at the company and was earning 30
million dollars a year.3 She was named copresident of Morgan Stanley
1 See Landon Thomas, Jr., Top Ranks of Women on Wall Street Are Shrinking, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 1, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/01/business/01wall.html [https://perma.
cc/HK6F-R9XM]; Dan Wilchins, Zoe Cruz Steps Down as Morgan Stanley Co-President,
REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2007, 7:28 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-morganstanley-manage
ment/zoe-cruz-steps-down-as-morgan-stanley-co-president-idUSN2924721520071130 [https://
perma.cc/E7U3-643P].
2 See Thomas, Jr., supra note 1.
3 See Joe Hagan, Only the Men Survive: The Crash of Zoe Cruz, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 27,
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and oversaw institutional securities along with wealth management;
her nickname was “Cruz Missile.”4 When the financial crisis hit, how-
ever, Cruz’s unit, which had invested heavily in subprime mortgages
and loans to private equity funds, faced billions in losses.5 Cruz had
done no worse than many others on Wall Street, and some thought
she had seen the crisis coming earlier than many others.6 Nonetheless,
when the Morgan Stanley board wanted someone to take the fall for
the bank’s losses, she became expendable.7 According to a friend of
her mentor, John Mack, his thoughts on Cruz were, “It’s you or me.
And guess what? I choose you.”8 One day after the board approved
his decision to terminate her, Mack called her into his office and said,
“I’ve lost confidence in you. I want you to resign.”9 New York Maga-
zine titled its account of her termination “Only the Men Survive.”10
Downturns are a particularly treacherous time for female executives,
particularly executives who take the same kind of risks as men.11
In 2008, Sallie Krawcheck was perhaps even better known than
Zoe Cruz. She had risen to become Chief Financial Officer and then
head of wealth management at Citigroup (“Citi”).12 Citi stood to lose
even more than Morgan Stanley as a result of the crisis, and it brought
in a new Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), Vikram Pandit from Mor-
gan Stanley.13 Pandit forced Krawcheck out in large part because she
2008), http://nymag.com/news/business/46476/ [https://perma.cc/852V-3PUA]; Wilchins, supra
note 1.
4 Michele Chandler, Zoe Cruz: Being Shoved out of Your Comfort Zone Has Advantages,
STAN. GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS. (May 15, 2010), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/zoe-cruz-
being-shoved-out-your-comfort-zone-has-advantages [https://perma.cc/ZL6H-JGZU].
5 See id.
6 See Hagan, supra note 3; see also Nathaniel Popper, Morgan Stanley in $2.6 Billion
Settlement over Crisis in Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.ny
times.com/2015/02/26/business/dealbook/morgan-stanley-in-2-6-billion-mortgage-settlement.
html [https://perma.cc/HZY8-KF2T] (suggesting that Morgan Stanley’s exposure was less than
other large banks).
7 See Thomas, Jr., supra note 1.
8 Hagan, supra note 3.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 See Kyle Stock, Ranks of Women on Wall Street Thin, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 20, 2010,
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704858304575498071732136704
[https://perma.cc/CJ68-MSNR] (finding women bore the brunt of the downturn after the finan-
cial crisis).
12 Geraldine Fabrikant, When Citi Lost Sallie, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2008), https://
www.nytimes.com/2008/11/16/business/16sallie.html [https://perma.cc/QZC8-U8S7].
13 David Ellis, Citi Splits Job, Names Pandit CEO, CNN MONEY (Dec. 11, 2007, 5:54 PM)
https://money.cnn.com/2007/12/11/news/companies/citigroup/index.htm [https://perma.cc/9XR7-
3BJR].
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wanted to do more to protect customers in her unit who lost money
due to Citi’s actions during the mortgage bubble.14 After this,
Krawcheck seemed to land on her feet. A year later, Bank of America
(“BofA”) hired her to run its wealth management unit.15 In the middle
of the financial crisis, she turned it into one of BofA’s profit centers.16
BofA, however, wanted more. It encouraged Krawcheck’s brokers to
engage in cross-selling, persuading their clients to buy “BofA banking
products like debit cards, online bill pay and credit cards.”17 When
asked about the practice by the press, Krawcheck responded that she
didn’t even like the term “cross-selling” because it sounds like some-
thing “we do to rather than for you.”18 BofA clearly did not like her
response. She was soon gone after two years on the job.19
In 2016, Krawcheck mused that she just did not share “the guy’s
club worldview that prevails in finance,” and the differences might
well be “rooted in gender,” with women “more focused on relation-
ships and long-term outcomes than men.”20 She speculated that
greater diversity in executive ranks might strengthen finance.21 Empir-
ical studies suggest there may be some truth to her armchair observa-
tions; corporate boards that include more women appear to produce
better results, and funds run by women outperform those run by
men.22
Cruz’s and Krawcheck’s stories might seem very different from
each other. Cruz went along with the boys despite reservations and
was fired in part because of it.23 Krawcheck expressed her reserva-
14 See Fabrikant, supra note 12.
15 See Halah Touryalai, Sallie Krawcheck Out at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, FORBES
(Sept. 6, 2011, 6:24 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2011/09/06/sallie-
krawcheck-out-at-bank-of-america-merrill-lynch/#cd7babe7d807 [https://perma.cc/W7B6-
CZD6].
16 See Brian Choi, Banktown: Assessing Blame for the Near-Collapse of Charlotte’s Biggest
Banks, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 423, 451 (2011) (observing that “Merrill’s profits are propping up
Bank of America, which is awash in credit card and other losses”).
17 Touryalai, supra note 15.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Jeff J. Roberts, I Was Fired for Being a Woman, Sallie Krawcheck Tells Crowd, FOR-
TUNE (Oct. 8, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/08/sallie-krewcheck-fired/ [https://perma.cc/
M3D8-UAHM].
21 See id.
22 See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89
N.C. L. REV. 855, 860–61, 864 (2011) (discussing the difference between the “business case” and
“rhetorical case” for diversity on corporate boards); Yaron Nili, Beyond the Numbers: Substan-
tive Gender Diversity in Boardrooms, 94 IND. L.J. 145, 160 (2019).
23 See Hagan, supra note 3. After Cruz left, Morgan Stanley settled claims of wrongdoing
stemming from the mortgage crisis for $3.2 billion, and while Cruz was not necessarily directly
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tions, fought for her customers, and was fired twice in large part be-
cause she did so.24 Yet, what brings the subjects of these stories
together is their gender. In a world where some men make enormous
sums by breaking the rules and getting away with it, most women are
at a disadvantage if they do not play on the same terms as men and
are perhaps at a greater disadvantage if they do.
This Article explores the gendered implications of corporate cul-
tures built on the idea of “breaking the rules” and expecting to get
away with it. The first Part considers the shift in corporate business
models that have come with the exaltation of shareholder interests
over the interests of other stakeholders.25 This Part shows first, how
the change in focus from long-term to short-term corporate objectives
and the related increase in high-stakes bonus systems rewards “win-
ning” more than rule compliance, and second, how a growing critique
in management literature documents the ways such practices produce
unethical and often counterproductive behavior. This Part then com-
pares these management critiques with what gender theorists call
“masculinity contests”26 and the ways that such contests valorize mas-
culine traits like competition, risk-taking, and win-at-all-cost mentali-
ties. Finally, this Part argues that while both the management critiques
and gender theories treat rule-breaking as a predictable, if not neces-
sarily intentional, byproduct of masculinities contests, some corporate
cultures make it central to their business models. These companies use
intensely competitive bonus systems to produce insular “young boys’
clubs” that promote a culture of rule-breaking; that is, the manage-
ment systems deliberately and instrumentally select for alpha males
who will flout the laws that stand in the way of these otherwise profit-
able business models.
The second Part provides an in-depth examination of Wal-Mart’s
managerial practices as an illustration of this system.27 It analyzes the
practices detailed in the nationwide class action brought against Wal-
Mart alleging sex discrimination that the Supreme Court rejected in a
involved in this wrongdoing, she oversaw some of those who were. See Camila Domonoske,
Morgan Stanley Will Pay $3.2 Billion for Contributing to Mortgage Crisis, NPR (Feb. 11, 2016,
11:32 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/02/11/466399992/morgan-stanley-will-
pay-3-2-billion-for-contributing-to-mortgage-crisis [https://perma.cc/BJZ9-6UE8]; Hagan, supra
note 3.
24 Touryalai, supra note 15.
25 See infra Part I.
26 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Berdahl et al., Work as a Masculinity Contest, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 422,
423 (2018).
27 See infra Part II.
41893-gwn_87-5 Sheet No. 47 Side B      01/29/2020   09:32:14
41893-gwn_87-5 Sheet No. 47 Side B      01/29/2020   09:32:14
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\87-5\GWN505.txt unknown Seq: 6 24-JAN-20 10:03
1110 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1105
5-4 vote on procedural grounds in 2011.28 As the Part shows, the same
practices that discouraged women from moving up in Wal-Mart’s
managerial ranks also enabled Wal-Mart’s widespread flouting of
wage and hour laws, with Wal-Mart paying out more than one billion
dollars in fines since 2000.29 The dismantling of the regulations30 that
once constrained corporate misbehavior allows companies like Wal-
Mart—itself the world’s largest retailer—to select for managers who
will exploit workers for the benefit of management, use wage theft to
increase their bonuses, and violate the law while insulating Wal-Mart’s
upper management from accountability. This Part shows why Wal-
Mart’s actions should be seen as a product of a uniform and inten-
tional set of national practices that disadvantage women, even if dis-
advantaging women is not the primary purpose of these practices.31
The third Part returns to the financial sector and shows how Wall
Street practices of enriching financiers at the expense of their custom-
28 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
29 PHILIP MATTERA, GOOD JOBS FIRST, GRAND THEFT PAYCHECK: THE LARGE CORPO-
RATIONS SHORTCHANGING THEIR WORKERS’ WAGES 2 (2018), https://www.goodjobsfirst.org/
sites/default/files/docs/pdfs/wagetheft_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6LS-KQQE] (“Among the
dozen most penalized corporations[] [is] Walmart[] with $1.4 billion in total settlements.”). Wal-
Mart has paid more than any other employer in resolving actions for wage theft, which involves
violating minimum wage and overtime laws, miscounting work hours, and wrongfully taking em-
ployees’ tips. Lauren Weber, Banks Pay out Some of the Biggest Settlements in Wage Disputes,
WALL STREET J. (June 5, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-pay-out-some-of-
the-biggest-settlements-in-wage-disputes-1528189200 [https://perma.cc/S9AF-L8VD].
30 William Black refers to this in the banking context as the “three des”: deregulation,
desupervision, and de facto decriminalization. William K. Black, Wallison and the Three “Des”—
Deregulation, Desupervision, and De Facto Decriminalization, NEW ECON. PERSP. (Feb. 6, 2011),
http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2011/02/wallison-and-three-des-deregulation.html [https://
perma.cc/9PLL-X43F]. In the Wal-Mart context, it refers to deunionization, the evisceration of
effective enforcement of existing wages and hours laws, and the obstruction of legislative efforts
to raise the minimum wage. See Laura Clawson, This Week in the War on Workers: Walmart
Loses $54 Million Wage Theft Lawsuit, DAILY KOS (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.dailykos.com/
story/2016/11/26/1603451/-This-week-in-the-war-on-workers-Walmart-loses-54-million-wage-
theft-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/B9WU-WWW4]; Steven Greenhouse, How Walmart Persuades Its
Workers Not to Unionize, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2015/06/how-walmart-convinces-its-employees-not-to-unionize/395051/ [https://perma.cc/
GE7U-YQQ9]. As this article goes to press, there is some indication that Wal-Mart is attempting
to raise pay to reduce employee turnover. See Bryan Pearson, Wal-Mart’s Employment Deploy-
ment and 6 Ways to Curb Retail Turnover, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bryanpearson/2017/01/24/wal-marts-employment-deployment-and-6-ways-to-curb-retail-turno-
ver/#298d3edf1008 [https://perma.cc/39SC-A548].
31 See Naomi Cahn, June Carbone & Nancy Levit, Gender and the Tournament: Reinvent-
ing Antidiscrimination Law in an Age of Inequality, 96 TEX. L. REV. 425, 471 (2018) (observing
that because business practices that disadvantage women have multiple motives, they become
harder to address through antidiscrimination law).
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ers contributes to the continuing paucity of women in management.32
Wall Street has long been described as an old boys’ culture that selects
for testosterone-fueled traders who thrive on adrenaline highs pro-
duced by the daily efforts to buy low and sell high.33 It also provides
stark reminders of the importance of the rule of law, as the savings
and loan crisis of the 1980s and the mortgage crisis of the 2000s both
followed the ill-considered loosening of regulations imposing over-
sight and accountability on the financial sector.34 This Part examines
how much of modern finance generates some of the highest salaries in
the modern economy through financial practices intended to fleece
unwary customers. It also examines how the triple bind that dispro-
portionately punishes both the women who engage in such practices
and those who refuse to do so contributes to gender disparities on
Wall Street.
The Article concludes that the practices that promote rule-break-
ing cultures also tend to exclude women and that the absence of diver-
sity in today’s corporate workplaces should trigger greater legal
scrutiny for reasons that go beyond the impact on women and others
disadvantaged by these cultures.35
I. ENRON REVISITED: HOW YOUNG BOYS BREAK THE RULES
Two separate literatures assess the rule-breaking cultures that
produced Cruz’s and Krawcheck’s dismissals. The first is an intensify-
ing critique of internal corporate competitions and their results.36
32 See infra Part III.
33 See generally MAUREEN SHERRY, OPENING BELLE (2016).
34 See, e.g., CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS:
PROMOTING GOOD BUSINESS THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT 78–79 (2015) (arguing
that the elimination of the New York Stock Exchange rule requiring investment banks to be held
in partnership form was a major factor in the mortgage crisis). See generally WILLIAM K. BLACK,
THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO OWN ONE (1st ed. 2005) (explaining the role of deregula-
tion in the savings and loan crisis and the importance of “reregulation” in ending it).
35 See infra Part IV. In this Article, we focus specifically on women and gender in rule-
breaking business cultures. In some cases, our analysis suggests that all outsider groups will be at
a disadvantage, reducing racial as well as gender diversity. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, A Prelimi-
nary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corpo-
rate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 37–38 (2003) (describing
more politicized decisionmaking and in-group favoritism as results of employee ranking and
inequitable salaries). In other cases, however, similar dynamics have the effect of punishing wo-
men generally and Asian, but not necessarily other, men for dominance displays because of the
failure to conform to stereotypes. See, e.g., Berdahl et al., supra note 26, at 431–32. Because the
dynamics underlying racial and gender diversity are somewhat different, this Article focuses on
the impact of women with the recognition that some, but not all, of the dynamics we describe
also apply to other forms of diversity.
36 See generally Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Gov-
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While management scholars lauded the rise of pay-for-performance
bonus cultures in the early years,37 a growing dissent links such prac-
tices to greater risk-taking, less collaboration and cooperation, and
more unethical—if not always outright illegal—conduct.38
The second and more nascent literature, drawn from feminism
and masculinities analysis, considers the gendered aspects of these de-
velopments in corporate culture and identifies them as “Masculinity
Contest Cultures.”39 This literature roots the nature of the practices in
the construction of hierarchies that define men’s positions in response
to one another and increase suspicion of outgroups, exacerbating gen-
der and other biases.40 The two critiques agree that these cultures pro-
duce a greater degree of rule-breaking than traditional management
cultures, but they treat the rise of more ethically dubious behavior as
an incidental byproduct of “win or die” competitions.
Based on these two literatures, we observe that when corpora-
tions normalize the narcissism that arises from masculinity contests,
greater toleration of rule-breaking—and greater gender disparity—is
a predictable consequence. Nonetheless, not all rule-breaking cultures
are the same. Some, like Microsoft in the Steve Ballmer era, find that
zero-sum corporate compensation systems in fact produce negative-
sum results, while others, such as Wal-Mart, carefully nurture labor
suppression as a core element of the firm’s distinctive business
model.41
A. The Celebration of Rule-Breaking
The idea of “breaking the rules” and “getting away with it” re-
quires explanation. This Article uses the term rule-breaking in two
senses: (1) to describe intentional law-breaking, and (2) to refer to a
mindset that dismisses or trivializes conventions like ethical precepts,
ernance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265 (2012) (discussing how short-termism has become pervasive in corpo-
rate cultures).
37 “Pay-for-performance bonus cultures” tend to combine two separate elements. First,
they link CEO pay to short-term changes in stock performance. See Michael C. Jensen & Wil-
liam H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Struc-
ture, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 351 (1976). Second, CEOs adopt competitive evaluation systems for
executives and other managers that compare employees to each other. See June Carbone &
Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 963, 100203 (2017). Both contribute to
the effect we describe and both systems have similar effects on motivation, but this Article fo-
cuses primarily on the internal bonus systems. See infra text accompanying notes 61–78.
38 Dallas, supra note 36, at 268, 273, 316–17.
39 See Berdahl et al., supra note 26, at 422.
40 See id. at 427.
41 See infra notes 175–244 and accompanying text.
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internal institutional controls, respect for customers, teamwork, and
restraints on the use of devious or manipulative behavior to elevate an
individual’s stature. “Getting away with it” does not require that every
rule breaker act with impunity. It simply requires that the rule break-
ers believe they can get away with it.42 It is true that the occasional
white-collar criminal does goes to jail; ask Enron CEO Jeff Skilling,
who was released from prison in 2018.43 The more important statistic,
however, is the number of high fliers charged in the financial crisis:
none among those most responsible, and just one if you consider a
larger group.44 Rule-breaking pays off when it produces large short-
term gains and the odds of having to disgorge those gains are small.45
The modern culture of rule-breaking is perhaps best understood
in opposition to the more staid corporate culture of the managerial
age, which emphasized lifetime employment and long-term corporate
objectives.46 Within these management cultures, the “organization
man’s” principal rewards came from the success of his company,
which depended on the strength of the company’s collective decision-
making procedures and the individual’s ability to fit into groups that
penalized self-aggrandizing conduct.47
In the 1960s, John Kenneth Galbraith argued that large corpora-
tions depended on principles of scientific management, which he
42 Donald Trump perhaps best exemplifies the mindset. See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Opin-
ion, Trump Keeps Breaking the Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/04/10/opinion/michael-cohen-trump.html [https://perma.cc/K368-CJMB].
43 Chris Morris, Former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling Released from Prison, FORTUNE (Aug.
31, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/08/31/enron-ceo-jeff-skilling-released-prison/ [https://
perma.cc/M323-8KN9]. It is notable that Skilling actually served time.
44 See Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-one-top-
banker-jail-financial-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/5SLK-MVMQ]. The New York Times Maga-
zine described Kareem Serageldin as the one executive convicted for a crime associated with the
financial crisis. Id. Serageldin was convicted for misstating the value of his company’s securities
to the tune of $100 million during a period when his former employer revised its past financial
statements to account for $2.7 billion that should have been reported. He cannot be ranked
among those most responsible for the crisis. Id.
45 See generally George A. Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, Looting: The Economic Under-
world of Bankruptcy for Profit (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. R1869,
1994), https://ssrn.com/abstract=227162 [https://perma.cc/W4CC-L5ST].
46 For a fuller explanation, see Carbone & Levit, supra note 37, at 975–81.
47 Both factors in a company’s success illustrate “bureaucratic” decisionmaking, which
originally meant the rational ordering of decisionmaking within complex organizations in accor-
dance with expertise, rather than personal relationships. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCI-
ETY 956–63 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Bedminster Press 1968) (1922) (linking the
rise of “bureaucracy” to increased power for those with expertise and making such expert-based
decisionmaking more opaque).
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lauded as the “technostructure.”48 Corporate officers acted as com-
pany stewards who linked company objectives to technocratic norms
that made the quality of their stewardship an indication of profes-
sional standing.49 William Whyte’s 1950s classic The Organization
Man described the same management style as “collectivist” and main-
tained that it produced risk-averse executives who enjoyed secure si-
necures as long as they followed the rules and played it safe.50 Both
agreed that executive positions in that era tended to involve job secur-
ity, selection of upper management from within the company’s ranks,
celebration of professional expertise and collaboration, status tied to
individual reputation rather than monetary incentives or reductionist
measures, loyalty to organizations, and objectives linked to long-term
institutional growth.51 Galbraith observed that business enterprise
should “only be understood as an effort, wholly successful, to synthe-
size by organization a group personality far superior for its purposes to
a natural person,”52 and that acting on self-interest was just not what
“a good company man” did.53 Whyte noted that company training pro-
grams during this time promoted “democratic values,” like the one at
General Electric (“GE”) that taught a man “[t]o get ahead, he must
[cooperate] with the others—but [cooperate] better than they do.”54 In
both accounts, the institution was more important than the individual
and encouraging “teamwork” was paramount.55 Individuals who bris-
tled at the need for consultation or the refusal of the team to embrace
ambitious, risky, or corner-cutting proposals often found themselves
out of the game.56
By the 1970s, however, this system was under increasing assault.
Facing growing competition from abroad and “stagflation” triggered
by the Arab oil embargo, American companies increasingly seemed
48 See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 71 (1967).
49 See Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change,
and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
305, 323–24 (2013) (explaining the influence of the stewardship ideal).
50 See WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN 3–4, 72–77 (1956).
51 Carbone & Levit, supra note 37, at 980; see also RICK WARTZMAN, THE END OF LOY-
ALTY: THE RISE AND FALL OF GOOD JOBS IN AMERICA 312 (2017).
52 GALBRAITH, supra note 48, at 61.
53 Id. at 117.
54 Gary Sernovitz, What “The Organization Man” Can Tell Us About Inequality Today,
NEW YORKER (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/what-the-organiza
tion-man-can-tell-us-about-inequality-today [https://perma.cc/EM3Q-LCZT].
55 See GALBRAITH, supra note 48, at 130.
56 See NAOMI CAHN, JUNE CARBONE & NANCY LEVIT, SHAFTED (forthcoming 2020).
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complacent, bureaucratic, and uncompetitive in the global market.57
Over the next 30 years, the “agency-cost”58 revolution transformed
management from an emphasis on steady growth and long-term objec-
tives to more rapid innovation and the maximization of short-term
increases in share prices.59 To realign management incentives, these
theorists advocated “pay-for-performance” approaches that would use
bonus systems linking executive compensation to short-term mea-
sures.60 Reliance on stock options increased and CEO compensation
skyrocketed, aligning executive and shareholder interests much more
closely and refocusing corporate attention on short-term boosts in
earnings rather than longer term institutional objectives.61
Corresponding to the change in corporate objectives was a
change in business models. With greater emphasis on the need to
quickly increase profits, many companies sought ways to produce im-
mediate gains with less concern for their long-term sustainability.62
And management, particularly new management, sought ways to
transform what had been bureaucratic and recalcitrant institutions.63
The result exchanged the risk-averse “organization man” for the win-
at-any-cost, “me-first” corporate survivor.64 Jack Welch, who oversaw
GE for 20 years starting in the early 1980s, was the master of this new
system. During the 18-year bull market that characterized most of
Welch’s tenure, GE’s revenue grew 385% and its stock market value
rose 4,000%,65 while Welch’s income quadrupled. Welch attributed
much of his success to a new management system. Dubbed “rank-and-
yank,” the system instituted performance evaluations that ranked em-
ployees on a forced curve.66 The bottom group (roughly 10% of the
57 See LUC BOLTANSKI & EVE CHIAPELLO, THE NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM, at xxxvi
(Gregory Elliott trans., 2004) (describing the relationship among global competition, innovation,
and “lean” production principles that emphasize innovation).
58 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 37, at 308.
59 See Dallas, supra note 36, at 268.
60 Lynn A. Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of “Pay
for Performance”, 39 J. CORP. L. 525, 533 (2014) (observing that between 1993 and 2014, the
percentage of CEO compensation attributable to incentive pay increased from 35% to 85%).
61 See Dallas, supra note 36, at 320–21.
62 See Larry Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2002).
63 Id.
64 Id. (describing executives as the “hyper-motivated survivors of a highly competitive
tournament” and as prevaricating, Machiavellian, and narcissistic).
65 Barry Ritzholtz, Judging GE’s Jeff Immelt Versus Jack Welch, BLOOMBERG (June 12,
2017, 12:45 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-06-12/judging-ge-s-jeff-immelt-
versus-jack-welch [https://perma.cc/F4L8-K2PS].
66 Jack Welch, “Rank-and-Yank”? That’s Not How It’s Done, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 14,
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workforce) was informed that their performance was inadequate and
they would be fired if it did not improve.67 A top group (roughly 20%)
received top bonuses and prospective promotions if they continued to
excel.68 This annual competitive pay, performance, and termination
system was designed to shake up the company and reorient its priori-
ties.69 Welch emphasized that “[i]t’s about aligning performance with
the organization’s mission and values. It’s about making sure that all
employees know where they stand.”70 It also made it easier to shed
employees and often entire divisions—loyalty to long-term employees
disappeared.71
Given GE’s success, Welch’s management system became widely
adopted. At one point, more than half of publicly traded companies
employed some version of the system.72 Since 2009, those numbers
have declined as companies have moved away from rigidly ordered
approaches, particularly those mandating termination of a fixed per-
centage of the workforce every year, but competitive ranking systems
that compare employees to each other remain common.73
The system has also been the subject of scathing reviews. The soul
searching started with the Enron and World.com scandals that fol-
lowed the dot.com bust in the early 2000s. Enron CEO Jeff Skilling
fostered a corporate culture described as “survival of the fittest—or
the nastiest.”74 His version of rank-and-yank fired the bottom 20% of
employees and lavishly rewarded others, including himself.75 At one
time, Enron was among the most admired companies in America,
2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/8216rankandyank8217-that8217s-not-how-it8217s-done-
1384473281 [https://perma.cc/JES2-F7MM].
67 Id.
68 Alan Murray, Should I Rank My Employees?, WALL STREET J. GUIDES, http://
guides.wsj.com/management/recruiting-hiring-and-firing/should-i-rank-my-employees/ [https://
perma.cc/7Q99-AULE].
69 Id.
70 Welch, supra note 66.
71 Murray, supra note 68.
72 Id.
73 Max Nisen, Why Stack Ranking Is a Terrible Way to Motivate Employees, BUS. INSIDER
(Nov. 15, 2013, 12:36 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/stack-ranking-employees-is-a-bad-
idea-2013-11 [https://perma.cc/4NRB-7HRL] (observing that 49% of companies reported that
they used “stack ranking systems” in 2009). Nisen states that by 2011, only 14% of companies
reported using forced ranking systems, but that most employees are still rated or ranked within
competitive systems. Id.
74 Jeffrey Skilling, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/2002/03/19/jskilling.html#274e77a468
43 [https://perma.cc/Z7ZM-WLSD].
75 Id.; see also PETER C. FUSARO & ROSS M. MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON:
EVERYONE’S GUIDE TO THE LARGEST BANKRUPTCY IN U.S. HISTORY 51–52 (2002).
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lauded for its innovation.76 “Jeff Skilling was incredibly charismatic,”
Sherrod Watkins, an Enron Vice President, observed. “You were cer-
tain he was just the brightest guy around, but in hindsight I really feel
we were somewhat like cult followers.”77 The combination of the ap-
pearance of success, produced by manipulating the firm’s complex
structure and accounting reports, intense internal competition, and
high-stakes bonuses made it easy for Skilling to impose his stamp on
the company and persuade those under him to do his bidding, regard-
less of whether his “bidding” served company interests.78
In 2001, Enron’s stock price, which had soared over the preceding
years to more than $80 per share, tanked following a series of revela-
tions about its irregular accounting procedures.79 Skilling left in Au-
gust 2001, claiming he wanted to spend more time with his family.80
After Enron’s complete collapse, Skilling was convicted of securities
fraud and lying to auditors and sent to prison.81
In the autopsies that followed, management experts identified
Enron’s evaluation system as a significant factor in its downfall.82
Their studies found that systems that use rankings to justify large dis-
parities in compensation encourage greater emphasis on self-interest,
higher levels of distrust that undermine teamwork, greater homogene-
ity in the selection of corporate management, less managerial account-
ability, and more politicized decisionmaking.83 Although advocates
like Welch and Skilling hailed the bonus systems as meritocratic, crit-
ics charge that they really produce a “young boys’ club” that protects
insiders at the expense of outsiders.84 More recent studies indicate
76 Nicholas Stein, The World’s Most Admired Companies: How Do You Make the Most
Admired List? Innovate, Innovate, Innovate. The Winners on This Year’s List, Compiled by the
Hay Group Consultancy, Tell How They Do It, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2002), http://archive.for
tune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2000/10/02/288448/index.htm [https://perma.cc/
99PT-BH73].
77 Lesley Curwen, The Corporate Conscience, GUARDIAN (June 21, 2003, 5:11 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/business/2003/jun/21/corporatefraud.enron [https://perma.cc/6VBV-
CJK3].
78 Id.
79 See Dan Ackerman, Enron Trades Itself, FORBES (Nov. 8, 2001, 8:47 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/2001/11/08/1108topenron.html#4f1ca4042833 [https://perma.cc/7JHN-7SNA].
80 See Jeffrey Skilling, supra note 74.
81 United States v. Skilling, Court Docket Number: H-04-025-SS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(June 21, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-vns/case/skillingjk [https://perma.cc/8L4C-
3N7P].
82 FUSARO & MILLER, supra note 75, at 52.
83 Dallas, supra note 35, at 37 (describing how Enron management used its bonus system
to reorient company behavior in counterproductive ways).
84 Companies with such systems tend to recruit ambitious (and relatively young) new hires
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that incentive pay generally, not just rank-and-yank systems that
threaten dismissal, have been “linked with opportunistic, unethical,
and even illegal executive behavior, including earning manipulations,
accounting frauds, and excessive risk-taking.”85
This behavior may be the point of such systems. These were not
aberrations or untoward negative consequences, but an integral com-
ponent of GE’s and Enron’s business models. Jack Welch, in justifying
his management approach, thought of business as a competition to be
won, and he “had, both morally and practically, to come first.”86
Welch defied the conventions of his era by shutting down plants, sell-
ing off divisions, and reducing the GE workforce by 25% his first few
years on the job.87 He also broke the law and the rules of ethical busi-
ness management. Accounting sleights of hand made it possible for
Welch to beat earnings expectations, and after he left, GE paid a $50
million penalty to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
to settle accounting fraud charges from the Welch era.88
Perhaps as tellingly, GE is struggling today in part because of
Welch’s reliance on GE Capital. While this GE division generated a
substantial share of GE’s earnings during the Welch era—and helped
to manipulate the earnings reports that allowed Welch to consistently
beat earnings expectations—it collapsed during the financial crisis and
may have ultimately doomed GE’s survival.89
Enron, of course, was much worse. With the deregulation of the
energy market, it switched from producing pipelines to trading in en-
“who want [] to make a lot of money fast.” Dallas, supra note 35, at 50. The new employees,
especially if they have limited experience elsewhere, more readily buy into shifts in corporate
orientation directed from the top. Id. at 49.
85 Stout, supra note 60, at 534.
86 Richard Bernstein, Books of the Times; Winning the Business Game with a Few Basic
Principles, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/14/books/books-of-the-
times-winning-the-business-game-with-a-few-basic-principles.html [https://perma.cc/SS4G-
PQAW].
87 Id.; James B. Stewart, Did the Jack Welch Model Sow Seeds of G.E.’s Decline?, N.Y.
TIMES (June 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/business/ge-jack-welch-im-
melt.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8MGT-C4N2]; Jack Welch, CNBC 25: REBELS, ICONS, AND
LEADERS (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/04/29/25-jack-welch.html [https://perma.cc/
ASZ8-SACT].
88 See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges General Electric with Ac-
counting Fraud (Aug. 4, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-178.htm [https://
perma.cc/2YWG-2ZFK].
89 See id.; Stewart, supra note 87. For a description of GE Capital’s involvement in the
mortgage boom that resulted in a $1.5 billion fine, see Jonathan Stempel, GE’s WMC Mortgage
Unit, Felled by Financial Crisis, Files Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2019, 11:04
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ge-wmc-bankruptcy/ges-wmc-mortgage-unit-felled-by-
financial-crisis-files-chapter-11-bankruptcy-idUSKCN1RZ1OI [https://perma.cc/T6F4-LK3H].
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ergy futures, with fraud becoming pervasive throughout much of the
company’s operations.90 Enron’s leaders expressed disdain for corpo-
rate oversight and financial regulatory rules, regarding them as obsta-
cles that hindered innovation and creativity.91 This disdain extended
not only to the law, but also to company rules and authority. In over-
seeing the company’s transformation, CEO Jeff Skilling “set employ-
ees loose, encouraging them to push the edge of every rule, even
without their supervisors’ knowledge.”92 Critics emphasize that En-
ron’s uncomfortably competitive corporate ethos, which continually
challenged (and threatened) workers, made it easier for employees to
rationalize their unethical conduct as successful business practices.93
While Enron generated more than its share of whistleblowers, its
whistleblowing records demonstrate the impact of competitive evalua-
tion systems. Reports of fraudulent activities dropped in the months
just prior to the annual review process and then rose dramatically
once the process was completed.94 The fear of negative performance
reviews not only discouraged complaints, it also made it easier to dis-
credit the dissenters and reward those who went along with the
program.95
The rise of unethical behavior does not just occur in companies
promoting outright fraud. It also affects the ethos of more traditional
companies.96 When Steve Ballmer succeeded Bill Gates as CEO of
Microsoft, for example, he too adopted a forced ranking system in an
effort to distinguish his management of the company from that of his
predecessor.97 As with Welch’s experience at GE and Skilling’s at En-
ron, the system did help Ballmer take charge of the company and
refocus its efforts. After Microsoft abandoned the system in 2013,
90 See John A. Byrne et al., The Environment Was Ripe for Abuse, BUS. WK., Feb. 25,
2002, at 118–19.
91 See id.
92 David Streitfeld & Lee Romney, Enron’s Run Tripped by Arrogance, Greed, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 27, 2002), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-jan-27-mn-25002-story.html
[https://perma.cc/Y4NS-L897].
93 See FUSARO & MILLER, supra note 75, at 51–52.
94 Lynn Brewer, Is There a Little Bit of Enron in All of Us?, 30 J. QUALITY & PARTICIPA-
TION 26, 28 (2007).
95 Id.
96 Even after the financial crisis, 42% of 3,000 executives interviewed for a 2016 survey
said that they “could justify unethical behavior to meet financial targets.” Hui Chen & Eugene
Soltes, Why Compliance Programs Fail, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 2018, https://hbr.org/2018/
03/why-compliance-programs-fail [https://perma.cc/HZG8-TYPZ].
97 See Kurt Eichenwald, Microsoft’s Lost Decade, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 2012), http://
www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2012/08/microsoft-lost-mojo-steve-ballmer [https://perma.cc/
84CK-S9UD].
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however, Vanity Fair published an article on “Microsoft’s Lost Dec-
ade” that attributed much of Microsoft’s failure to remain competitive
to its evaluation system.98 A Microsoft engineer explained:
The behavior this [rank and yank] engenders, people do eve-
rything they can to stay out of the bottom bucket . . . . People
responsible for features will openly sabotage other people’s
efforts. One of the most valuable things I learned was to give
the appearance of being courteous while withholding just
enough information from colleagues to ensure they didn’t
get ahead of me on the rankings.99
As a result, potential market-changing innovations like e-book
and smartphone technology “were killed, derailed, or delayed amid
bickering and power plays.”100 Management experts who systemati-
cally study such environments conclude that these workplaces en-
courage “unethical behavior, because some individuals are willing to
pay to improve their rank by sabotaging others’ work or by increasing
artificially their own relative performance.”101 Michael Jensen, the
Harvard Business School professor who initially proposed pay-for-
performance, has since recanted.102 In an article entitled Paying Peo-
ple to Lie, he observed that using targets like earnings in an organiza-
tion’s performance measurement and compensation systems simply
encourages employees to game those systems.103
The more recent poster child for toxic management is Uber. It
started with the goal of disrupting the taxi industry104 It made little
effort to comply with potentially applicable regulations and its “busi-
ness model is predicated on lawbreaking”—giving it a competitive ad-
vantage over taxi companies that follow the rules.105 Uber has been
accused of everything from flouting local taxi regulations to using
98 Id.
99 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
100 Id.
101 Gary Charness et al., The Dark Side of Competition for Status, 60 MGMT. SCI. 38, 41
(2014).
102 Compare Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much
You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1990, at 139–41, with Michael C. Jensen, Pay-
ing People to Lie: The Truth About the Budgeting Process, 9 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 379 (2003).
103 See generally Jensen, supra note 102.
104 See, e.g., Justin Bariso, Why Does Uber Keep Breaking the Law? Because They’re Dis-
rupting, of Course, INC. (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.inc.com/justin-bariso/why-does-uber-keep-
breaking-the-law-because-theyre-disrupting-of-course.html [https://perma.cc/J4JP-SU8K].
105 Benjamin Edelman, Uber Can’t Be Fixed—It’s Time for Regulators to Shut It Down,
HARV. BUS. REV. (June 21, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/06/uber-cant-be-fixed-its-time-for-regula
tors-to-shut-it-down [https://perma.cc/64FC-FKB8] (“Uber succeeded in making lawbreaking
normal and routine by celebrating its subversion of the laws relating to taxi services.”).
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burner phones and fake paperwork to disrupt competitors with can-
celled rides.106 These types of activities have made it the subject of
numerous investigations in the United States and abroad,107 yet at
least to date, it has been more successful in bending the rules to its
liking than regulators have been in calling it to account.108 The com-
pany deliberately created a “Hobbesian environment . . . in which
workers are sometimes pitted against one another and where a blind
eye is turned to infractions from top performers.”109 A whistleblower
reported that every manager seemed to be “fighting their peers and
attempting to undermine their direct supervisor so that they could
have their direct supervisor’s job.”110 Managers even boasted about
their exploits against one another, and the company seemed to en-
courage their infighting.111 Top executives and top performers faced
no consequences for their misdeeds, and sexual exploits became part
of the company’s culture, representing rewards for success.112 This
106 See ADAM LASHINSKY, WILD RIDE: INSIDE UBER’S QUEST FOR WORLD DOMINATION
34, 119 (2017); Shirley Li, Uber Accused of Booking Thousands of Fake Rides to Mess with Rival
Lyft, ATLANTIC (Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/uber-
accused-of-booking-thousands-of-fake-rides-with-rival-lyft/375936/ [https://perma.cc/2AZK-
HT82].
107 See Biz Carson, Uber Faces Investigations for Potentially Violating Foreign Bribery
Laws, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2017, 6:34 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bizcarson/2017/08/29/uber-
is-under-investigation-for-potentially-violating-foreign-bribery-laws/#697e708d5e01 [https://
perma.cc/5W6P-Y7JQ] (describing investigation of foreign bribery laws); Megan Rose Dickey,
Uber Faces Potential $13.5 Million Lawsuit over Data Breach, TECHCRUNCH, https://tech-
crunch.com/2018/03/05/uber-data-breach-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/G483-YTQX] (describing ac-
tion in Pennsylvania alleging violation of data breach notification laws); Hyunjoo Jin, South
Korea Court Says Uber Violated Transport Law, Latest Setback for U.S. Firm, REUTERS (Apr.
25, 2017, 11:23 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-tech-southkorea-idUSKBN17S09F
[https://perma.cc/2QCX-YZRQ] (describing South Korean action finding Uber violated Korean
bribery laws); Eric Newcomer, Uber Pushed the Limits of the Law. Now Comes the Reckoning,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2017, 4:11 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-10-11/
uber-pushed-the-limits-of-the-law-now-comes-the-reckoning [https://perma.cc/UN3V-YS3R]
(stating Uber is facing five criminal investigations in the United States).
108 Edelman, supra note 105. Uber has even been accused of designing a new app to hide its
drivers from regulatory scrutiny. See Mike Isaac, How Uber Deceives the Authorities Worldwide,
N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball-pro-
gram-evade-authorities.html [https://perma.cc/VE7S-2RD2].
109 Mike Isaac, Inside Uber’s Aggressive, Unrestrained Workplace Culture, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/technology/uber-workplace-culture.html
[https://perma.cc/8R7V-L9PM]. Not coincidentally, Uber has faced numerous sexual harassment
allegations. See, e.g., Greg Bensinger, Uber’s Top Deal Maker Resigns After Misconduct Allega-
tions Revealed, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 22, 2018, 5:58 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ubers-
top-dealmaker-cameron-poetzscher-resigns-1540238793 [https://perma.cc/687X-C7SN].
110 Isaac, supra note 109.
111 See id.
112 See id.
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shows that keeping employees focused on their internal competitions
increases the unaccountability of those at the top.113 While CEO
Travis Kalanick was eventually forced out as head of the company, he
retains a net worth of over four billion dollars in large part because of
his exploits.114
In this atmosphere, all bets do not pay off, but the competition is
intense, the perception of risk increases intensity, and the focus of
these competitions is on immediate returns.115 In the process, such en-
vironments reduce executive tenure.116 In a system that continually
asks “what did you do for me today?”, each job may simply become a
stepping stone to the next. Companies that are not loyal to their em-
ployees do not command loyalty in return.117 Larry Ribstein described
the executives who thrive in such an environment as
hyper-motivated survivors of a highly competitive tourna-
ment . . . who have proven their ability to make money while
putting on a veneer of loyalty to the firm. At least some of
the new breed appear to be Machiavellian, narcissistic,
prevaricating, pathologically optimistic, free from self-doubt
and moral distractions, willing to take great risk as the com-
pany moves up and to lie when things turn bad, and nurtured
by a corporate culture that instills loyalty to insiders, obses-
sion with short-term stock price, and intense distrust of
outsiders.118
113 See Dallas, supra note 35, at 37.
114 See Grace Donnelly, Travis Kalanick Net Worth Tops $4 Billion with Sale of Uber Stock,
FORTUNE (Jan. 19, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/01/19/travis-kalanick-net-worth/ [https://
perma.cc/GG3X-389T].
115 See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 36, at 268.
116 See, e.g., HILL & PAINTER, supra note 34, at 99–100.
117 See BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 57, at 93–95; WARTZMAN, supra note 51, at
305–06, 312; Guy Berger, Will This Year’s College Graduates Job-Hop More Than Previous
Grads? LINKEDIN: OFFICIAL BLOG (Apr. 12, 2016), https://blog.linkedin.com/2016/04/12/will-
this-year_s-college-grads-job-hop-more-than-previous-grads [https://perma.cc/4R62-BSU6]
(“Over the last 20 years, the number of companies people worked for in the first five years after
they graduated has nearly doubled.”). See generally Matthew J. Bidwell, What Happened to
Long-Term Employment? The Role of Worker Power and Environmental Turbulence in Explain-
ing Declines in Worker Tenure, 24 ORG. SCI. 1061 (2013).
118 Ribstein, supra note 62, at 9 (footnote omitted). Indeed, R
[t]he system rewards those who put their own interests ahead of the group and who
focus more on immediate financial rewards than on either a service orientation or
the institution’s long-term interests. The new system is responsible for the shift
from the pyramid structure of compensation in the manufacturing age to a more
steeply banked system in which those at the top earn dramatically more than any-
one else does.
Cahn, Carbone & Levit, supra note 31, at 454 (footnote omitted).
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Ultimately, in companies that value “winning” at all costs, those
who win by breaking the rules and getting away with it can be hand-
somely rewarded.119 Their rule-breaking helps ensure loyalty not to
the company, but to the insiders who protect their backs.120 It also
produces the intense distrust of anyone perceived to be an outsider
who might not be so willing to look the other way.121 Customers, em-
ployees, and even the company itself become pieces on a chess board
useful to the extent they help those caught up in corporate contests
win.
B. Why Only the Men Survive
A more recent critical literature has analyzed the growth of these
environments as “masculinity contests.”122 Feminism has long criti-
qued hierarchy and described the relationship between the lust for
and payoffs of power in terms of opportunities for sexual access.123
Masculinities theorists emphasize, however, that while patriarchy is
ordinarily thought of in terms of the assertion of male power over
women, “it is also a system that valorizes the creation of hierarchies
that give men power over other men.”124 While the oppression of wo-
men is certainly an important consequence of patriarchy, it may para-
doxically not be the central point.125 War, deprivation, competition,
and uncertainty increase the intensity of the fight for scarce resources
and the stakes of ending up at the losing end of male status hierar-
chies.126 The insecure seek to assert control over their environments as
119 See Ribstein, supra note 62, at 9.
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 See Berdahl et al., supra note 26.
123 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 174 (1987); Jessica A. Clarke, Inferring Desire, 63 DUKE L.J. 525, 599 (2013) (arguing that
“unwanted sexual aggression is a form of masculine dominance” and “harassment is about
power, not desire”).
124 June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Unequal Terms: Gender, Power, and the Recreation of
Hierarchy, in 69 STUD. IN L., POL., & SOC’Y 189, 195 (Austin Sarat, Maxine Eichner & Clare
Huntington eds., 2016) (quoting A.G. JOHNSON, THE GENDER KNOT: UNRAVELING OUR PATRI-
ARCHAL LEGACY 26 (2007)).
125 Id.; see also David Brooks, Opinion, Two Cheers for Feminism! What Girls and Women
Get Right About Empathy and Connection, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/10/11/opinion/feminism-gender-empathy-psychology.html [https://perma.cc/6HW7-
V3PE] (stating that “for thousands of years social thinking has been dominated by men—usually
alpha men—who saw life as a place where warriors and traders went out and competed for
wealth and power”).
126 See, e.g., FIONNUALA NI´ AOLA´IN, DINA FRANCESCA HAYNES & NAOMI CAHN, ON THE
FRONTLINES: GENDER, WAR, AND THE POST-CONFLICT PROCESS 51 (2011) (discussing how
hypermasculinity during conflict results in male dominance power struggles).
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both their best defense against loss and humiliation, and the surest
route to gain what they desire.127 Yet, to the extent some succeed in
gaining control over others, they increase the insecurity of those be-
low them, further increasing the intensity of the conflict over re-
sources. In this sense, the Hobbesian claim that the “[b]usinesse [of
the World], consisteth almost in nothing else but a perpetuall conten-
tion for Honor, Riches, and Authority”128 becomes a description of
the stakes in corporate tournaments, particularly those that artificially
inflate the payoffs in competitive bonus systems and deliberately ma-
nipulate worker insecurity. Feminism and masculinities theory then
describe how the resulting struggle for “Honor, Riches and Author-
ity” plays out in gendered terms, and how the gendered nature of the
competition increases with the dismantling of what had been state-
sponsored sources of security and predictability through the imposi-
tion of the rule of law and adherence to established customs and
procedures.
In our previous article, we showed how work environments that
operate like tournaments disadvantage women—and most men—by
selecting for narcissists who thrive in such environments at the ex-
pense of others and making it harder for women and other outsiders
to play by the same rules as insider men.129 The more recent gender
theory literature complements this analysis by explaining how com-
petitive environments with high-stakes pay-for-performance cultures
create “masculinity contest cultures,”130 with such “contests [] most
prevalent—and vicious—in male-dominated occupations where ex-
treme resources (fame, power, wealth) or precarious resources . . . are
at stake . . . .”131 These environments increase feelings of vulnerability
and intensify aggression, risk-taking, sexual harassment, and
homophobia.132
Today, work is an important site for determining status, particu-
larly male status. Relative status determines access to resources, socie-
127 See Berdahl et al., supra note 26, at 428 (“[B]ecause manhood is socially attained (e.g.,
being dominant over others, being a breadwinner), it depends on others’ views and deference,
which makes manhood conditional and tenuous.”).
128 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR THE MATTER, FORME, & POWER OF A COMMON-
WEALTH: ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVILL 389 (Andrew Cooke ed., 1651).
129 See Cahn, Carbone & Levit, supra note 31, at 445–59.
130 Kenneth Matos, Olivia (Mandy) O’Neill & Xue Lei, Toxic Leadership and the Mascu-
linity Contest Culture: How “Win or Die” Cultures Breed Abusive Leadership, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES
500, 502 (2018) (listing four dimensions of “masculinity contest cultures,” including “Show No
Weakness”).
131 Berdahl et al., supra note 26, at 429.
132 Id. at 428.
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tal standing, mating behavior, and the ability to control others.133 As
societal inequality has grown, a higher percentage of all wage in-
creases has tended to go competitive, bonus-based, and overwhelm-
ingly male-dominated sectors, including finance, upper management,
tech, and the upper ranks of professions.134 In these “win or die” envi-
ronments, “the spoils of winning, or the cost of losing,[] are particu-
larly high.”135 The result tends to conflate what it means to be a man
with the traits necessary to succeed in such environments.
The results of these competitions do not necessarily correlate
with better performance for the organization.136 Instead, performance
evaluations focus on traits associated with masculinity.137 “In this zero-
sum game, men compete at work for dominance by showing no weak-
ness, demonstrating a single-minded focus on professional success,
displaying physical endurance and strength, and engaging in cut-throat
competition.”138 The goal of these internal competitions is not so
much to improve a company’s competitive position over its external
rivals as to choose the “real men” who will become part of the small
network that works to outmaneuver rivals to gain control of that com-
pany’s resources.139
Within these environments, women and other outsiders can play
supporting roles. On Wall Street, for example, women often enjoy
greater opportunities as lawyers rather than traders.140 Women and
133 See JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS RE-
MAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 2 (2014).
134 See Cahn, Carbone & Levit, supra note 31, at 456–57.
135 Berdahl et al., supra note 26, at 429.
136 See Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 85–94 (1995) (describ-
ing the persistence of counterproductive traits in the selection of police officers (aggressiveness,
self-assuredness and reliance on physical strength) and attributing it to the definition of the
police office role in terms of stereotypical masculine traits even when other approaches to polic-
ing that emphasize different traits (e.g., the de-escalation of conflict) are more effective).
137 See Berdahl et al., supra note 26, at 430.
138 Id.; see also Naomi Cahn, June Carbone & Nancy Levit, Discrimination by Design, 51
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2019); Interview by June Carbone with Nikki D. Pope, Managing Dir., High
Tech Law Inst., Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law (Sept. 23, 2018).
139 See Berdahl et al., supra note 26, at 433.
140 Compare Jennifer Cheeseman Day, Number of Women Lawyers at Record High but
Men Still Highest Earners, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 8, 2018), https://www.census.gov/library/
stories/2018/05/women-lawyers.html [https://perma.cc/TBP6-M6RS] (noting that 38% of lawyers
are women), with Anna Irrera, Wall Street Wants More Female Traders, but Old Perceptions Die
Hard, REUTERS (June 14, 2018, 1:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-banks-trading-gen
der/wall-street-wants-more-female-traders-but-old-perceptions-die-hard-idUSKBN1JA0DF
[https://perma.cc/AKC2-GAQC] (noting that women account for about 28% of Financial Indus-
try Regulatory Authority-registered traders).
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people of color also report they are assigned higher rates of “office
housework” than more glamorous roles.141 Nikki Pope, for example,
notes that she worked at a company where female engineers were as-
signed to accompany marketing staff to trade shows because the male
engineers viewed attending trade shows as beneath them.142 When
trade shows proved successful in generating substantial income, how-
ever, male engineers replaced the lone female.143 At the same time,
women and minorities are more likely “to report pushback for asser-
tiveness, self-promotion and anger, all of which are key weapons in
the masculinity contest.”144 In a business model that rewards employ-
ees who can successfully outmaneuver others, women are handi-
capped not just because they are not boys, but because cold-blooded
competition breeds distrust, particularly of outsiders.145
This sets up what we have previously identified as a triple bind.
To win in these negative-sum competitions requires “ambition, ruth-
lessness, and domination.”146 Women and at least some minorities,
however, are much more likely to be disliked and punished if they
display such traits.147 They become particularly suspect if they band
together with each other in alliances designed to outflank the in-
group.148 They may also be less valuable partners for members of the
dominant group if they are perceived as having less clout.149 Women
and minorities who correctly perceive the game as rigged become less
likely to apply, which, in turn, increases the reality of the environment
as predominately white and male.150 The triple bind suggests that wo-
men lose if they do not play by the same terms as the men, lose if they
do try to play on the same terms by being disproportionately punished
141 Berdahl et al., supra note 26, at 431.
142 Interview by June Carbone with Nikki D. Pope, supra note 138.
143 Id.
144 Berdahl et al., supra note 26, at 431.
145 See Ribstein, supra note 62, at 20.
146 Berdahl et al., supra note 26, at 432.
147 Id. (observing that Asian men are also punished for dominance displays where they
conflict with stereotypical expectations); see Peggy Klaus, Neither Men nor Mice, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 6, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/jobs/07preoccupations.html [https://
perma.cc/8MBL-UB3T]; see also DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM 67–68 (2007) (noting
women starting to climb the corporate ladder are actually walking a tightrope because they must
be sufficiently aggressive to excel, but not overly aggressive because they will be perceived as
pushy).
148 See, e.g., Bethany M. Coston & Michael Kimmel, White Men as the New Victims: Re-
verse Discrimination Cases and the Men’s Rights Movement, 13 NEV. L.J. 368, 377 (2013).
149 Cahn, Carbone & Levit, supra note 31, at 447.
150 Id.
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for displaying the self-centered, rule-breaking behavior of the men,
and over time become less likely to apply for such positions and thus
more likely, individually and as a group, to be perceived as lacking
what it takes to succeed in such environments.151
As a result, such environments become associated with stere-
otypically masculine traits.152 Moreover, as these cultures celebrate
winning as an end by itself, they also dismantle the constraints de-
signed to protect both men and women from unscrupulous behavior.
In cases like Uber, this may mean that managers who undercut other
managers are rewarded for their brashness rather than chastised for
undermining the company.153 In other companies, as we will discuss
below,154 rule-breaking may be carefully channeled in directions that
pay off for those at the top at the expense of everyone else.155 In this
sense, bonus cultures may quite intentionally select for managers who,
for example, set punch clock software to round down on entered time
and make automatic break deductions, or who simply cut short em-
ployees’ breaks.156 These latter cultures do not necessarily reward em-
ployees at any level who flout management directives, but they
carefully select for those who care more about maximizing their bo-
nuses than ensuring employee well-being.157
Both types of cultures—those where the rule-breaking is a by-
product of a masculinity competition as an end in itself and those
where high-stakes bonuses and other forms of competition are instru-
mentally employed to break the law while immunizing senior manage-
ment from accountability—may value the abilities to deceive, exploit,
and oppress, as markers of dominance.158 Both cultures also exacer-
bate gender inequality. In considering the prospects for gender equal-
ity and corporate reform, however, notable differences arise from
151 See id. at 446–47.
152 These traits, however, can also be described by personality analyses that do not explic-
itly reference gender. See, e.g., Michael C. Ashton & Kibeom Lee, The HEXACO Model of
Personality Structure and the Importance of the H Factor, 2 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL.
COMPASS 1952, 1958 (2008), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1751-
9004.2008.00134.x [https://perma.cc/CK2E-JCJ4] (discussing the drive to power and its correla-
tion with personality type high in narcissism and low in honesty and humility).
153 See supra notes 104–14 and accompanying text.
154 See infra Parts II, III.
155 See infra Section II.A. See generally Matos et al., supra note 130.
156 Elizabeth C. Tippett, How Employers Profit from Digital Wage Theft Under the FLSA,
55 AM. BUS. L.J. 315, 316, 320–21 (2018) (stating that at a Houston, Texas medical center, “inter-
rupted meal breaks were so common that employees referred to them as ‘NFL days,’ which
stood for No F***ing Lunch”).
157 See id.
158 See Dallas, supra note 35, at 45–52.
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treating rule-breaking as an incidental byproduct of more intense
competition instead of seeing the structure as one carefully designed
to break the law and get away it.
C. In the Long Term, We Will All Be Dead; in the Medium Term,
We Will Be Working Elsewhere
Despite the celebration of these competitive atmospheres, the ex-
isting management literature agrees that such environments do not
produce better results. Gender scholars describe such dog-eat-dog in-
ternal competitions as “zero-sum,”159 but criminologists prefer the
term “negative-sum.”160 In “negative-sum” competitions, participants
compete against each other to become the winner entitled to appro-
priate a larger proportion of the company’s resources for themselves
at the expense of others, and the terms of the competition may reduce
the overall value of the company.161 Moreover, when a company suc-
ceeds in law evasion, as Uber has with taxi regulations, the result
resets the market and forces other companies to compete on the new
terms. The result creates a “Gresham’s dynamic,” or a race to the bot-
tom in which honest companies find they cannot compete with ethi-
cally compromised ones.162
Management scholars have documented these negative conse-
quences. For example, one study administered to 500 respondents
found that workplaces ranking high in masculinity contest norms re-
ported more dysfunctionality, worse coworker behavior, and poor in-
dividual outcomes.163 Given the importance of teamwork to almost all
organizational success, environments that encourage ruthless competi-
tion also tend to promote individual self-interest at the expense of
organizational goals.164 Other studies indicate that such environments
undercut loyalty to the organization and produce higher levels of
burnout and turnover, further reducing employee tenure and discour-
aging management investment in worker training.165
159 See, e.g., Sophie L. Kuchynka et al., Zero-Sum Thinking and the Masculinity Contest:
Perceived Intergroup Competition and Workplace Gender Bias, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 529, 530 (2018).
160 See Ric Simmons, Ending the Zero-Sum Game: How to Increase the Productivity of the
Fourth Amendment, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 550, 553 (2012).
161 See Eichenwald, supra note 97.
162 George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970).
163 See generally Peter Glick, Jennifer L. Berdahl & Natalya M. Alonso, Development and
Validation of the Masculinity Contest Culture Scale, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 449 (2018).
164 See Berdahl et al., supra note 26, at 434.
165 Id. at 434–35.
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Moreover, studies find that such environments select for “toxic”
managers more eager to demonstrate their own success than to look
out for the interests of their workers.166 Organizations that rank high
in masculinity contest traits are likely to select for managers who iden-
tify strength with bullying behavior and exploit weaker employees.167
Such managers tend to identify with the workers who display strength
and “promote exclusion and harassment toward historically disadvan-
taged groups and men with resistant masculinities.”168 In these envi-
ronments, managers are often selected for their masculinity displays
rather than for greater competence in the task at hand.169 Scholars
also find that workers in such environments are more likely to experi-
ence sexual or racial harassment and report a more sexist culture.170 It
is hardly a wonder, therefore, that more diverse companies do better.
A study of almost 22,000 companies reported that businesses with
more equal gender leadership have a “15 percent boost to profitabil-
ity.”171 To produce greater diversity requires greater cooperation and
trust, which promotes better teamwork, and better teamwork pays off.
It is not necessarily the presence of women that increases perform-
ance; instead, the organizational qualities that produce greater pro-
ductivity may also promote diversity.172 The question therefore
becomes why such toxic and negative-sum environments persist.
166 See Matos et al., supra note 130, at 503.
167 See Berdahl et al., supra note 26, at 435.
168 See id. at 435.
169 See Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, Why Do So Many Incompetent Men Become Leaders?,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 22, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/08/why-do-so-many-incompetent-men
[https://perma.cc/S5ED-V4NJ] (summarizing research literature on gender differences in selec-
tion and performance); see also Case, supra note 136, at 86–87.
170 See Glick et al., supra note 163, at 466.
171 Marcus Noland et al., Is Gender Diversity Profitable? Evidence from a Global Survey 4,
8–9 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 16-3, 2016), https://piie.com/publications/
wp/wp16-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA43-8P5B]; Aimee Picchi, In Business, More Women at the
Top Means More Profits, CBS NEWS (Feb. 9, 2016, 2:53 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
more-women-more-profits/ [https://perma.cc/DB4C-6WZH].
172 See Fairfax, supra note 22, at 862. This position, in a sense, sidesteps the debate between
the business case and the moral argument for diversity because it maintains that a commitment
to transparency, ethical leadership, and trust are necessary to produce more than a token com-
mitment to diversity, and that a genuine commitment to diversity is also likely to produce
greater commitment to transparency, ethical leadership, and trust. Id. In contrast, there is no
reason to believe that the inclusion of individual minority or female representatives per se is
likely to transform business cultures. See id.
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II. WOMEN AND AN “OPPRESS THE EMPLOYEES” BUSINESS
MODEL: WAL-MART STORES, INC. V. DUKES REVISITED
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes173 was the largest class action in
history: 1.5 million current and former female Wal-Mart employees
from stores across the country joined lead plaintiff Betty Dukes in
claiming that the company systematically discriminated against wo-
men, particularly in awarding promotions.174 They maintained that
Wal-Mart had a “uniform ‘corporate culture’” in which managers’ bi-
ases against women ran rampant.175 Although women made up more
than two-thirds of Wal-Mart’s hourly employees and almost 90% of its
customer services managers, they were less than 20% of store manag-
ers at the time when discovery in the case ended.176 Even when wo-
men entered the supervisory ranks, they were paid less than men.177
Male store managers earned an average of $16,400 per year more than
female managers; male district managers earned $62,000 more than
female district managers, and male regional vice presidents earned a
staggering $140,000 more than their female counterparts.178 Moreover,
while Wal-Mart claimed to give its managers a measure of autonomy,
the gender differences were remarkably consistent across the coun-
try.179 The results lagged far behind other retailers who typically re-
ported that women held more than 50% of management positions.180
Wal-Mart also has been fined more for shortchanging its workers
than any other company in the country.181 As a retailer, Wal-Mart em-
ploys a large, relatively unskilled workforce, and with 2.3 million em-
ployees, is the largest private employer both in the United States and
the world.182 Its business model depends on keeping prices low.
Founder Sam Walton liked to brag, “‘We’re going to be successful, but
173 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
174 Id. at 344.
175 Id. at 345.
176 Brad Seligman, Patriarchy at the Checkout Counter: The Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
Class Action Suit, in WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALISM 237–38
(Nelson Lichtenstein ed., 2006).
177 Id. at 236–37.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 239–40.
180 Id. at 238–39.
181 MATTERA, supra note 29, at 2 (“The employer that has paid far and away the most in
wage theft penalties is Walmart, with more than $1.4 billion in fines and settlements since
2000.”); id. at 8.
182 Lauren Weber, Some of the World’s Largest Employers No Longer Sell Things, They
Rent Workers, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 18, 2017, 11:46 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/some-
of-the-worlds-largest-employers-no-longer-sell-things-they-rent-workers-1514479580 [https://
perma.cc/JH8A-V2YA].
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the basis is a very low-wage, low-benefit model of employment.’”183
To do that, the company hired primarily women in its hourly ranks,
starting with the pool of displaced farm women eager for employment
in the rural Arkansas communities where Wal-Mart started in the late
1940s.184
As worker protections expanded in the 1960s to boost the wages
of overwhelmingly female retail employees, Wal-Mart worked much
harder to evade them. Walton ruthlessly fought unionization, and he
and his successors devoted “enormous skill and energy to the avoid-
ance or emasculation of almost every other governmental mandate . . .
that sought to regulate the price and quality of [] labor.”185 To do that,
Wal-Mart needed a managerial force that would identify with the
company’s obsessive suppression of labor rights rather than the work-
ers they supervised.186 The Wal-Mart manager selection practices that
favored men and the business model that depended on minimizing
labor costs reinforced each other. Like Enron executives, Wal-Mart
lobbyists spent considerable sums on efforts to weaken regulatory en-
forcement, and when faced with inconvenient regulations, they often
just ignored them, encouraging labor practices that minimized costs
regardless of whether they complied with wages and standards laws.187
As a result, the company has paid out more than one billion dollars in
fines and settlements for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
including $242 million in 2016 alone.188 These violations include pay-
ing workers less than minimum wage, mischaracterizing hours worked
to avoid overtime rates, and in some cases failing to ensure workers
were paid for hours worked.189
The Dukes sex discrimination case did not mention wage theft. It
presented a largely statistical account that showed how Wal-Mart sys-
tematically paid its female employees less than men and failed to pro-
mote them on a comparable basis with male employees.190 The district
183 NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE RETAIL REVOLUTION: HOW WAL-MART CREATED A
BRAVE NEW WORLD OF BUSINESS 320 (2009).
184 Id. at 59.
185 Id. at 90.
186 Id. at 89–90.
187 See Catherine Ruetschlin, How Walmart and Home Depot Are Buying Huge Political
Influence, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 3, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/how-walmart-and-home-de
pot-are-buying-huge-political-influence [https://perma.cc/ZY6K-RHR9].
188 Lauren Weber, Bank Pays Out Some of the Biggest Settlements in Wage Disputes, WALL
STREET J. (June 5, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-pay-out-some-of-the-big
gest-settlements-in-wage-disputes-1528189200 [https://perma.cc/S9AF-L8VD].
189 Id.; MATTERA, supra note 29, at 4–5, 8.
190 See generally Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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court issued a 52-page opinion finding the plaintiffs’ case to be over-
whelming.191 To the extent the case commented on the reasons for the
discrimination, it presented a picture of a bunch of Arkansas-influ-
enced “rednecks” who just could not see women in supervisory
roles.192 The Supreme Court rejected the class action in a 5-4 deci-
sion.193 It bought Wal-Mart’s argument that each store made individ-
ual hiring and promotion decisions and that the plaintiffs’ proposed
class was too big to have enough common questions of law and fact.194
In the course of the litigation, the plaintiffs never raised the issue of
Wal-Mart’s labor practices; they never asked whether Wal-Mart’s ef-
forts to exploit its employees might explain Wal-Mart’s poor record of
hiring female managers. There is every reason to believe, however,
that these factors are directly related.
A. Wage Theft and Wal-Mart’s Management Practices
Whether or not Wal-Mart sought to discriminate against women,
it consciously designed its selection of managers to keep wage costs
low. The process did not necessarily result in the “best” managers in
any objective sense, but instead promoted those who would fit into a
corporate culture that legitimatized Wal-Mart’s hierarchical structure,
emphasized keeping costs low at the expense of its employees, and
“insulate[d] most employees from other calls upon their loyalty.”195
The result also created a culture of marginalized—and overwhelm-
ingly female—hourly employees clustered just above the minimum
wage and an overwhelmingly male managerial group selected to keep
the hourly employees from bettering their lot.196
First, Wal-Mart sought to create a distinctive corporate culture,
one that supplied identity and commanded loyalty.197 This is not unu-
191 See id.
192 LIZA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING WOMEN SHORT: THE LANDMARK BATTLE FOR WORK-
ERS’ RIGHTS AT WAL-MART 39 (2005).
193 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
194 Id. at 359–60.
195 Nelson Lichtenstein, Wal-Mart: A Template for Twenty-First Century Capitalism, in
WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALISM, supra note 176, at 17. R
196 “[I]n 2001, 67% of all hourly workers and 78% of hourly department managers were
women. By contrast, only 35.7% of assistant managers, 14.3% of store managers, and 9.8% of
district managers were female.” Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social
Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 49
(2009) (footnotes omitted).
197 Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s
Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
1209, 1216 (2011); Lichtenstein, supra note 195, at 16–22.
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sual, as the earlier discussion of “the organization man” illustrates.198
Identification as insiders confers status, motivates devotion to the
firm, and primes employees to discount criticisms of a company’s busi-
ness practices. Wal-Mart, however, also consciously sought to promote
employees who had little experience and few opportunities outside of
Wal-Mart,199 increasing the company’s ability to shape its managers’
views of appropriate business practices, including the often-unlawful
suppression of employee interests. Walton himself did not care either
about college degrees or specialized training.200 As one Wal-Mart
scholar notes, “The first requirement for promotion at Wal-Mart has
always been commitment and dedication to the company and the job.
Skill and knowledge are far less important than ‘attitude’ and identifi-
cation with the Wal-Mart culture.”201 When the company did recruit
college graduates, it often deliberately sought out the B and C stu-
dents at denominational colleges and the branch campuses of state
universities in the South and Midwest.202 Wal-Mart wanted “young
men, and a few women” with modest career ambitions who would ac-
cept the low salaries and fully commit to the company ethos.203 The
cultivation of such an in-group mindset, however, also tends to be as-
sociated with “a highly aggressive, opportunistic stance toward outsid-
ers” and tends to be “fairly commonplace in hypercompetitive
industries like retail, financial services, and computer technology.”204
That mindset thus sets the stage for Wal-Mart’s business practices and
the maintenance of an old boys’ network implementing them.205
198 See supra notes 46–56 and accompanying text; David W. Hart & Jeffery A. Thompson,
Untangling Employee Loyalty: A Psychological Contract Perspective, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 297
(2007) (emphasizing that identity and loyalty used to involve reciprocal bonds in the context of
companies that invested in their employees, but that while today’s companies still try to demand
loyalty from their employees, they are no longer as loyal in return).
199 See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 183, at 96.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 21.
203 Id. at 21.
204 Langevoort, supra note 197, at 1216.
205 The term “old boys’ club” or network refers to “an informal system of friendships and
connections through which men use their positions of influence by providing favors and informa-
tion to help other men.” Audrey Nelson, Women and the Good Ole Boys Club, PSYCHOL. TO-
DAY (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/he-speaks-she-speaks/201703/
women-and-the-good-ole-boys-club [https://perma.cc/J2D8-PX2F]. By contrast, we use the term
“young boys’ club” to describe the deliberate selection of employees with oversized ambitions
and little experience who will do management’s bidding, however ethically dubious, because
these employees tend to be young and male.
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Once Wal-Mart recruited such employees, the second critical ele-
ment in the company’s system was its use of bonuses as a large compo-
nent of manager compensation. Around the time of the Dukes
litigation, the base pay for a Wal-Mart manager was about $60,000 per
year, but managers could triple that amount in bonuses if they “hit
their numbers.”206 The managers were “relentlessly and mercilessly
graded on their capacity to hold labor costs below a fixed ratio of the
sales generated by their store in any given week.”207 Supervisors had
more control over wages than sales, and those who succeeded in keep-
ing down such costs received the largest bonuses.208 If their labor costs
rose beyond the limits Wal-Mart set, “the hours worked by associates
[we]re slashed, wages [we]re frozen, and the regional vice president
t[old] the store manager to relinquish his keys and find another
job.”209 Even in periods in which Wal-Mart did well, “10 to 15 percent
of store managers were demoted each year.”210 This made the
store manager’s job one of Wal-Mart’s most difficult and critical
positions.211
The bonus culture easily could have contributed both to wage
suppression and gender differences in compensation and promotion.
Wal-Mart, like Wall Street, did not loudly proclaim it was encouraging
its employees to cheat its workers, though it certainly proclaimed its
devotion to keeping labor costs low.212 It created incentives for man-
agers to minimize labor costs, and senior management did not inquire
too closely into the methods used to do so. Former Wal-Mart manag-
ers consistently report that this system signals a willingness to pro-
mote people who will enforce questionable labor practices,213 and
those managers were overwhelmingly male.214 Those managers spe-
206 LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 183, at 92.
207 See id. at 88.
208 See Hamilton Nolan, A Walmart Manager Describes Walmart’s Mismanagement,
GAWKER (Aug. 22, 2014, 11:51 AM), http://gawker.com/a-walmart-manager-describes-walmarts-
mismanagement-1625530679 [https://perma.cc/LHF6-DZBP] (“I’ve often had to cut associates
hours in order to ensure that all of the salaried managers would receive our annual bonuses.”).
209 LICHETENSTEIN, supra note 183, at 88.
210 Id. at 92.
211 See Seligman, supra note 176, at 236–37.
212 See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 183.
213 See Jared Cram, Ten Things Wal-Mart Doesn’t Want You to Know, GENERATION PRO-
GRESS (May 9, 2005), http://genprogress.org/voices/2005/05/09/14117/ten-things-walmart-doesnt-
want-you-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/7TGZ-ERAU] (“According [to] a former Wal-Mart man-
ager in Alabama and Mississippi, Wal-Mart’s central office threatened to write up managers who
didn’t reduce labor costs and this led to managers leaning on assistant managers to falsify time
sheets and force employees to work without pay.”).
214 Id.
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cialized in “nickel and diming” workers,215 suppressing unionization,216
and not only ruling out overtime (a complete no-go at Wal-Mart) but
even evading the minimum wage.217 When journalist Barbara
Ehrenreich went undercover to work in hourly retail sales at Wal-
Mart, she reported the assistant manager railed at workers for “time
theft” if they gathered to talk to each other.218 These practices some-
times went so far as failing to pay employees for work they had per-
formed.219 For example, some managers who faced chronic
understaffing and the inability to ask other employees to put in more
hours pressured workers to clock out and then go back to work or
continue working through breaks or lunch hour.220 Other managers
simply “adjusted” the time cards of workers who reported more than
40 hours a week, unilaterally adding rest breaks or increasing meal
periods.221  Wal-Mart’s business model depended on systematic and
relentless attention to reducing labor costs in any possible way.222
Given that manager pay overwhelmingly consisted of bonuses tied to
the ratio of sales over labor costs and that women’s net pay was lower
215 See generally BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN
AMERICA 135–52, 173, 183–91 (2001).
216 Steven Greenhouse, How Walmart Persuades Its Workers Not to Unionize, ATLANTIC
(June 8, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/how-walmart-convinces-its-
employees-not-to-unionize/395051/ [https://perma.cc/WA5F-H5U9] (“Walmart maintains a
steady drumbeat of anti-union information at its more than 4,000 U.S. stores, requiring new
hires—there are hundreds of thousands each year—to watch a video that derides organized
labor.”).
217 WARTZMAN, supra note 51, at 331.
218 See EHRENREICH, supra note 215, at 146.
219 See Laura Clawson, This Week in the War on Workers: Walmart Loses $54 Million Wage
Theft Lawsuit, DAILY KOS (Nov. 26, 2016, 6:55 PM), https://www.dailykos.com/story/2016/11/26/
1603451/-This-week-in-the-war-on-workers-Walmart-loses-54-million-wage-theft-lawsuit [https://
perma.cc/G5RX-Z5WG]. As this Article goes to press, there is some indication that Wal-Mart is
attempting to raise pay to reduce employee turnover. See Bryan Pearson, Wal-Mart’s Employ-
ment Deployment and 6 Ways to Curb Retail Turnover, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2017, 5:11 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/bryanpearson/2017/01/24/wal-marts-employment-deployment-and-6-ways-
to-curb-retail-turnover/#298d3edf1008 [https://perma.cc/7HDU-CD9P].
220 Steven Halebsky, The Retail Revolution, 27 SOC. F. 255, 256 (2012) (reviewing LICHTEN-
STEIN, supra note 183). R
221 LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 183, at 107.
222 And it still does. See, e.g., Lauren Thomas, As Wal-Mart Blitzes Internet Retail, Debate
Rages over Company’s Impact on U.S. Wages, CNBC (Apr. 22, 2017, 11:01 AM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2017/04/20/wal-mart-still-front-and-center-of-debate-over-minimum-wages.html
[https://perma.cc/Y9SA-UV55] (“Wal-Mart’s business model is pretty simple . . . . The company
pays its workers poverty wages. It offers few benefits, and it manipulates workers’ hours and
understaffs its stores . . . . That low-wage business model serves one purpose: It’s so the company
can maximize profits that go to some of the wealthiest people on the planet.”).
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than men’s, Wal-Mart’s presumption that men would be more willing
to do in their workers than women may have been accurate.
Third, Wal-Mart’s efforts to eliminate management’s fingerprints
from these harmful practices helps explain the persistence practices
unfriendly to women, such as its relocation policy. Wal-Mart required
anyone interested in a managerial position to be “willing to relocate
. . . whenever and wherever [Wal-Mart] needed them,” often with no
more than a couple of weeks’ notice.223 In his 1992 autobiography,
Walton wrote, “[W]e’ve had the attitude that if you wanted to be a
manager at Wal-Mart, you basically had to be willing to move at a
moment’s notice” and that’s “not really appropriate anymore.”224
Prodded by his wife and daughter, he acknowledged the requirement
“really put good, smart women at a disadvantage in our company be-
cause at that time they weren’t as free to pick up and move as many
men were.”225 However, while Walton claimed to have “seen the
light,” the Supreme Court acknowledged the relocation policy re-
mained in place at the time of the Dukes decision in 2011.226 The dis-
trict court in Dukes found that, on average,
each Store Manager is transferred to a different store 3.6
times after achieving that title. A majority of these transfers
are into different districts and are often into different re-
gions. . . . This degree of mobility . . . help[ed] ensure that a
uniform Wal-Mart Way culture operates consistently
throughout all stores.227
Managers who move repeatedly do not develop overly close ties
to the employees they supervise, their individual stores, or the com-
munities in which they live.228 They understand that their primary fo-
223 Naomi Schoenbaum, The Family and the Market at Wal-Mart, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 759,
759–60 (2013).
224 FEATHERSTONE, supra note 192, at 29.
225 Id.
226 See LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 183, at 102. The Supreme Court expressly acknowledged
the relocation policy in its decision. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 343 (2011)
(noting “a willingness to relocate” as a condition of promotion).
227 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 152 (N.D. Cal. 2004); see also FEATHER-
STONE, supra note 192, at 69–70.
228 See Naomi Schoenbaum, Stuck or Rooted? The Costs of Mobility and the Value of Place,
127 YALE L.J.F. 458, 466 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/stuck-or-rooted [https://
perma.cc/D894-PXTX] (“Strong workplace ties also provide emotional support and care that
can contribute to performance. Strong ties with coworkers even serve as a bulwark against work-
place harassment, and can help workers better cope with harassment or mistreatment if it
occurs.”).
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cus needs to be on Bentonville’s metrics of success, not on their
employees’ well-being.229
Fourth, the construction of managerial jobs to require that man-
agers fill in the gaps left by hourly employees contributes further to
the undesirability of these positions for women. With Wal-Mart’s
chronic understaffing and an employee base that includes many new,
part-time, or disaffected workers, meeting store needs can be chal-
lenging.230 Inevitably, some employees will quit, fail to show up, or call
in sick on short notice.231 Salaried supervisors who do not receive
overtime pay are expected to fill in the gaps.232 Nelson Lichtenstein
describes assistant managers as “the shock troops” who hold the sys-
tem together.233 He reports they work “a minimum of forty-eight
[hours] a week, but more likely fifty-five and sixty, eating on the fly
and never quite sure when they’ll leave for the evening.”234 These
hours increase during the Christmas shopping season.235 Wal-Mart’s
refusal to adequately staff its stores or pay overtime to its hourly em-
ployees required managers willing to put their devotion to Wal-Mart
ahead of family needs.236
Fifth, maintenance of this culture came through selection of those
with the appropriate mindset.237 Wal-Mart could not exactly advertise
for those willing to suppress wages through whatever means necessary
or for managers willing to break the law without instructions from
Bentonville.238 Instead, it adopted what seemed to be a “redneck net-
work” in which existing managers tapped the anointed to become part
of the management team without ever posting the positions or adopt-
ing formal selection criteria.239 In the Dukes litigation, the district
229 Id. at 468; see also A´ine Cain, Walmart Employees Dish on What It’s Actually Like to
Work at the Retail Giant, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 2, 2018, 9:51 AM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/walmart-store-employees-describe-working-retail-giant-2018-7 [https:/
/perma.cc/3FB7-LKJP]. One employee who had worked for Wal-Mart for 15 years said “they felt
the management of their store tended to be ‘scared to death’ of those above them in the corpo-
rate chain of command.” Id.
230 See Cain, supra note 229.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 183, at 103.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 93.
236 Ellen Israel Rosen, How to Squeeze More out of a Penny, in WAL-MART: THE FACE OF
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALISM, supra note 176, at 243, 253–54 (describing understaffing R
and the pressure it creates on managers).
237 Id. at 253 (describing the youth of the men selected as store managers).
238 See id. at 254.
239 See id. at 253. “It is undisputed that, until January 2003, Wal–Mart did not post job
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court found that plaintiffs provided “significant evidence of company-
wide corporate practices and policies, which include excessive subjec-
tivity in personnel decisions, gender stereotyping, and maintenance of
a strong corporate culture.”240 The preservation of discretion in mana-
gerial hiring in the face of an otherwise carefully scripted corporate
ethos contributed to Wal-Mart’s half century of success in suppressing
wages.241
The Dukes plaintiffs argued that the system produced an old
boys’ club based on affinity; the defendants argued the system re-
flected business considerations made at individual stores across the
country.242 Neither mentioned wage theft. Other commentators have
emphasized, however, that Wal-Mart policies informally encouraged
its managers “to break the rules that Wal-Mart formally upheld.”243 If
managers met their goals for high sales and low wages, no one in-
quired too closely into how they did so.244 If the managers did not
meet the goal, they were subject to audits, investigations, and poten-
tial demotion.245 The informal and subjective selection process was al-
most certainly designed to select managers who fit into such a system
and to protect the backs of the managers who selected them, manag-
ers who probably flourished because of their willingness to promote
their own interests at the expense of their employees.
B. Why Only the Wal-Mart Men Thrive
Wal-Mart, with its Arkansas roots and (young and old) boys’ net-
works, may well have engaged in traditional forms of sex discrimina-
tion in the selection of its managers, overlooking well-qualified
women who were willing to join the men in nickel and diming their
employees.246 Yet, the system Wal-Mart adopted to suppress wages
also seemed guaranteed to select for male managers.
Wal-Mart’s bonus system, emphasizing the bottom line at the ex-
pense of personal relationships or compliance with the law, fits the
vacancies for its Assistant Management Training Program, and it posted only a small number of
vacancies for the Co–Manager position.” Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 149
(N.D. Cal. 2004).
240 Seligman, supra note 176, at 241.
241 See id. at 240.
242 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 343–44 (2011).
243 Rosen, supra note 236, at 254.
244 See id.
245 See id. at 254–55.
246 Indeed, although Dukes was unsuccessful in class certification, subsequent claims of sex
discrimination have been settled. See CAHN, CARBONE & LEVIT, supra note 56, at 25. R
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stereotypes describing prototypically masculine competitive values
versus feminine relationship-focused values; it is easier to find more
men than women who care enough about money, power, and status to
be willing to shortchange their employees.247 Earlier studies among
entrepreneurs, who presumably have greater interest in increased
compensation than the average employee, showed men were more
likely than women to cite the opportunity for increased compensation
as a reason they would switch jobs, although the differences were
smaller.248
Compounding the gendered effects is the degree of risk. Wal-
Mart artificially increased the pressure on its managers by encourag-
ing them to “beat yesterday”; that is, to always outperform the pre-
ceding year even though the ability to do so was not always within the
managers’ control.249 Their ability to do so determined not only the
size of their bonuses, but the possibility they would be demoted and
moved to another store.250 Stereotypes suggest women are more risk
averse,251 though more rigorous studies show that among profession-
als, there are no significant gender differences in risk propensities or
in success at managing risk.252 Nonetheless, jobs that build in the type
of artificial competition that Wal-Mart encouraged tend to discourage
women from applying.253 Laboratory studies using a general popula-
247 See Deborah L. Rhode, The “No-Problem” Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural
Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1774 (1991).
248 See Stanley Cromie, Motivations of Aspiring Male and Female Entrepreneurs, 8 J. OCCU-
PATIONAL BEHAV. 251, 255, 257 (1987) (finding female entrepreneurs are less interested in
money than male entrepreneurs); see also VENKAT KUPPUSWAMY & ETHAN MOLLICK, SECOND
THOUGHTS ABOUT SECOND ACTS: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN SERIAL FOUNDING RATES 1, 3
(2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2752689 [https://perma.cc/BDW7-
WYBJ] (finding women founded 25.3% fewer entrepreneurial ventures than men, and attribut-
ing this differential at least in part to male hubris and female humility).
249 Rosen, supra note 236, at 254.
250 Id. at 254–55.
251 See, e.g., JULIE A. NELSON, GENDER AND RISK-TAKING: ECONOMICS, EVIDENCE, AND
WHY THE ANSWER MATTERS 12, 19 (2018).
252 See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and
Explanations 42 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21913, 2016), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w21913.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X2K-N66Z] (indicating male and female
managers and entrepreneurs did not differ in risk propensities); see also CORDELIA FINE, TES-
TOSTERONE REX: MYTHS OF SEX, SCIENCE, AND SOCIETY 115–16 (2017) (challenging the rela-
tionship between testosterone and risk-taking propensity).
253 Blau & Kahn, supra note 252, at 38 n.60, 41 (indicating that controlling for differences
in attitudes toward competition among business students accounted for part of the gendered
wage gap, and describing a study that found “the more heavily the compensation package tilted
towards rewarding the individual’s performance relative to a coworker’s performance, the more
the applicant pool shifted to being more male dominated”).
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tion indicate that the effect of competition on gender-based prefer-
ences may be independent of the individual’s orientation toward risk
or confidence in her performance.254 For example, when given a
choice between performing a task on a noncompetitive piece-rate ba-
sis versus in a contest, 73% of the men selected the contest, while only
35% of the women did so.255
Wal-Mart’s managerial jobs, moreover, did not just build in
greater risk, they also rewarded those managers willing to put their
own interests ahead of those of others. They accordingly gave the
greatest bonuses to managers lacking in empathy, particularly empa-
thy for those employees whose hours needed to be involuntarily cut or
who needed to be encouraged to forgo breaks or merited overtime.256
Women are not generally unwilling to compete, but men tend to be
more attracted to competitions that involve domination and control
over others, while women are more likely to be “personal develop-
ment competit[ors]” who are concerned with the feelings and welfare
of others.257
Finally, the selection of managers willing to do what is necessary
to shortchange their employees (all while the top executives look the
other way) also tends to favor men over women. A 2018 article in
Psychology Today showing a picture of a boy indicated that children
who break the rules are more likely to grow up to be rich because they
thrive on competition.258 Forbes ran a lengthy article explaining how
breaking the rules is necessary to executive success and how women
are less likely to do it.259 Wal-Mart managers, in pursuing their bo-
254 See Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do
Men Compete Too Much?, 122 Q.J. ECON. 1067, 1078 (2007); see also Jeffrey A. Flory, Andreas
Leibbrandt & John A. List, Do Competitive Workplaces Deter Female Workers? A Large-Scale
Natural Field Experiment on Job Entry Decisions, 82 REV. ECON. STUD. 122, 124 (2015) (“[T]he
gender gap in applications more than doubles when a large fraction of the wage (50%) depends
on relative performance,” reflecting greater female than male aversion to such environments.).
255 See Deborah M. Weiss, All Work Cultures Discriminate, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J.
247, 264 (2013).
256 Rosen, supra note 236, at 253.
257 See Richard M. Ryckman et al., Values of Hypercompetitive and Personal Development
Competitive Individuals, 69 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 271 (1997); see also FINE, supra note
252, at 151–72 (“The Myth of the Lehman Sisters”). We are addressing gendered male and fe-
male attributes without addressing whether they are socially constructed or biologically driven.
258 See Amy Morin, Why Kids Who Break the Rules Are More Likely to Become Rich,
PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/what-mentally-
strong-people-dont-do/201803/why-kids-who-break-the-rules-are-more-likely-become [https://
perma.cc/DJ66-G232].
259 See Barbara Apple Sullivan, Women and Rule Breaking: Why It’s Essential for Business
Success, FORBES (Oct. 28, 2011, 12:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbeswomanfiles/2011/
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nuses, violated numerous social norms and sometimes the law without
first asking permission from Bentonville.260 In doing so, they played
out the gendered tendencies Psychology Today traced to early
childhood.
Wal-Mart’s selection of managers involved practices like frequent
moves and long, unpredictable hours that discouraged women from
applying. Its old boys’ network also involved a measure of gender
stereotyping and outright sexism.261 Yet, the most important factor in
producing both worker exploitation and overwhelmingly male manag-
ers may have been a business model that depended on keeping wage
costs low. In the process, Wal-Mart found that selecting managers
based on certain stereotypically male traits paid off.
Wal-Mart is in many ways a curious example of a rule-breaking
culture. It rose to fame initially for its use of bar codes to micro-
manage inventory and tight control over a carefully planned network
of stores.262 Sam Walton liked to emphasize its down-home culture,
with small-town, working-class roots.263 However, Wal-Mart never be-
lieved that wage and hours laws should apply to its employees, and it
built its low-wage empire on the ability to never pay overtime, permit
unions to form, or pay a cent more than necessary in labor costs.264 It
accordingly chose from the same playbooks as Enron and Uber in us-
ing a relatively high-stakes bonus system to select for those willing
to break wages and hours laws while insulating Bentonville from
accountability.
III. WALL STREET REVISITED: WHERE BLOWING UP YOUR
CUSTOMERS IS THE NAME OF THE GAME
Wal-Mart is not alone in adopting a business model premised on
the exploitation of others and selecting a predominately male
workforce because of it. Wall Street has never been hospitable to wo-
men. From the time women first fought their way into Wall Street
10/28/women-and-rule-breaking-why-its-essential-for-business-success/#72e2855b4d26 [https://
perma.cc/ND5G-Z8RF].
260 See supra Section II.A.
261 See FEATHERSTONE, supra note 192, at 39.
262 See Sandra S. Vance & Roy V. Scott, Sam Walton and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.: A Study in
Modern Southern Entrepreneurship, 58 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 231, 234, 245 (1992).
263 See Leah Goldman, The Incredible Story of Walmart’s Expansion from Five & Dime to
Global Megacorp, BUS. INSIDER (July 20, 2011 1:48 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-
incredible-story-of-walmarts-expansion-from-five-and-dime-to-global-megacorp-2011-7 [https://
perma.cc/828G-C2ZX].
264 See Greenhouse, supra note 216.
41893-gwn_87-5 Sheet No. 63 Side B      01/29/2020   09:32:14
41893-gwn_87-5 Sheet No. 63 Side B      01/29/2020   09:32:14
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\87-5\GWN505.txt unknown Seq: 38 24-JAN-20 10:03
1142 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1105
firms, stories about sexual harassment were commonplace. One of the
most famous concerned the “boom-boom room.”265 In the 1990’s, the
brokerage firm Smith Barney had an office in Garden City, New York
with a basement room.266 Women entered at their peril. It “was deco-
rated in ‘fraternity house style,’ with a toilet bowl hanging from the
ceiling and Bloody Marys served from a trash can.”267 Pamela Mar-
tens, a Smith Barney broker who was told when she was hired in the
1980s that the firm was “bias[ed] in favor of male brokers,” described
how on the only occasion she entered the room, the branch manager
“forcibly kissed” her.268 That manager often entertained clients in the
“boom-boom room,” but female brokers did not dare venture there.
Martens led a class action of 22,000 potential claimants alleging sex
discrimination against Smith Barney, and the firm eventually
settled.269
In the years leading up to this lawsuit, women had successfully
increased their Wall Street ranks. The number of female stock analysts
at brokerage firms rose from five percent in the 1970s to 20% in the
late 1980s.270 Yet, even as Smith Barney settled its case, the percentage
of women plunged following the dot-com bust.271 After 2000, the abso-
lute number of women on Wall Street fell, and it took until the recov-
ery from the next financial crisis for the numbers to return to their
1990s levels.272
Perhaps the most perplexing part of women’s Wall Street losses is
their failure to make more progress in areas where they should have
265 See Susan Antilla, Decades After “Boom-Boom Room” Suit, Bias Persists for Women,
N.Y. Times: Dealbook (May 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/23/business/dealbook/
decades-after-boom-boom-room-suit-bias-persists-for-women.html [https://perma.cc/J6BP-
LB97].
266 See id.
267 Proposed Settlement in Smith Barney Harassment Case Includes Mediation: Martens v.
Smith Barney, Inc., 3 ANDREWS SEXUAL HARASSMENT LITIG. REP. 8 (1997).
268 Id.
269 See Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 2003 WL 21543506, No. 96 Civ. 3779 (JGK), at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2003), vacated sub nom. Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2001);
Complaint at 1, Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 96 Civ. 3779
(CBM)); SUSAN ANTILLA, TALES FROM THE BOOM-BOOM ROOM: WOMEN VS. WALL STREET, at
xiv (2002).
270 Margo Epprecht, The Real Reason Women Are Leaving Wall Street, QUARTZ (Sept. 5,
2013), https://qz.com/121085/the-real-reason-women-are-opting-out-of-wall-street/ [https://
perma.cc/GG3U-MLKP].
271 Id.
272 Alexander Eichler, Gender Wage Gap Is Higher on Wall Street than Anywhere Else,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 19, 2012, 11:09 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/19/gender
-wage-gap-wall-street_n_1362878.html [https://perma.cc/T9KY-H3QL].
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excelled: brokerage and advising. The traits necessary to succeed in
financial advising and wealth management read like a description tai-
lored for women: relationship building, strong communication skills,
and rapport with a diverse group of clients and customers.273 While
comfort with finance and risk management is necessary, math genius
is not; humanities and history majors are welcome to apply.274 Yet,
relatively few of the professionals in this field—by some accounts just
13%—are women.275 Personal financial advisors show the largest gen-
der gap in compensation in the entire economy.276 A significant reason
is the method of compensation. Financial advisors tend to be paid
based on “the amount of assets under management . . . or by commis-
sions on product sales, as opposed to less tangible outcomes such as
client satisfaction.”277 This emphasizes not only the need to aggres-
sively build investment portfolios, but to engage in practices that may
involve intrinsic advisor-customer conflicts of interest.
These conflicts have a long history in finance, one that offers an-
other take on how to promote oneself at the expense of others—this
time at the expense of another major corporate stakeholder: the
customer.
A. Bringing Back Predatory Financial Practices
Financial crises have often been attributed to the predatory be-
havior of those marketing financial instruments. Indeed, the “roaring
twenties,” which created the bubble ending in the Stock Market Crash
of 1929, marked the first time ordinary citizens flooded into the stock
market, and the first time a majority of shareholders in many major
American corporations were women.278 When Congress sought to de-
termine the causes of the Great Depression, it put a large part of the
273 CERTIFIED FIN. PLANNER BD., MAKING MORE ROOM FOR WOMEN IN THE FINANCIAL
PLANNING PROFESSION 7 (2014), https://www.cfp.net/docs/about-cfp-board/cfp-board_win_
web.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VDD-SW2L]; Helen Bostock, Broad Range of Skills Needed in
Wealth Management, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2011), https://www.ft.com/content/77be8a96-553a-
11e0-87fe-00144feab49a [https://perma.cc/2XMH-VHRD].
274 CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER BOARD, supra note 273, at 18–19. R
275 Mindy Diamond, Why Aren’t More Women in Wealth Management?, WEALTH MGMT.
(May 14, 2014), http://www.wealthmanagement.com/careers/why-aren-t-more-women-wealth-
management [https://perma.cc/G8KG-R9G7].
276 See Derek Thompson, Why the Gender-Pay Gap Is Largest for the Highest-Paying Jobs,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/the-sticky-floor-
why-the-gender-wage-gap-is-lowest-for-the-worst-paying-jobs/383863/ [https://perma.cc/7ZYL-
NPH2].
277 CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER BOARD, supra note 273, at 21.
278 See WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 129 (Little, Brown & Co.
1927) (1927) (“For a surprisingly large number of great corporations more than half of the share-
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blame on the financiers who pushed the sale of securities on the un-
wary and vulnerable.279 Charles Mitchell, the head of National City
(the predecessor to Citigroup), personified these practices.280 During
the 1920s, Mitchell pushed the integration of City Bank’s commercial
banking activities with National City’s securities operations.281 During
that period, Mitchell presided over an eightfold increase in the Bank’s
capital and used it “to acquire other banks and trust companies,” sta-
tioning bonds salesmen in each new branch and office.282 By the mid-
1920s, City Bank had become the largest bank (and one of the biggest
companies) in the United States, with record profits and foreign of-
fices around the world.283 Congressional hearings in the 1930s demon-
strated Mitchell’s role in engineering the stock market boom of the
previous decade, which ensured riches for City’s executives at the ex-
pense of customers, who were knowingly sold worthless securities.284
These revelations contributed to the New Deal securities and banking
reforms, particularly Glass-Steagall, which mandated the separation of
investment and commercial banking.285
The deregulatory era of the later part of the 20th century has seen
the return of financial crises fueled by predatory sales practices.286 Al-
most all involve the exploitation of customers. This new era started
with the repeal of a New York Stock Exchange rule mandating that
investment banks that traded on the exchange be held in partnership
form, ensuring the firm partners would have personal liability for
bank misdeeds.287 Salomon Brothers, a leading investment banking
holders are women—in American Telephone for 1926, 200,000 of the 366,000 were on the distaff
side.”).
279 See id. at 196–97.
280 See MICHAEL PERINO, THE HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET 77 (2010) (describing Mitch-
ell’s reputation as “the greatest bond salesman who ever lived”).
281 See id. National City owned City Bank. See id.
282 Id. at 80.
283 See id. at 81.
284 See id. at 78–81; see also Thomas F. Huertas & Joan L. Silverman, Charles E. Mitchell:
Scapegoat of the Crash?, 60 BUS. HIST. REV. 81, 88 (1986).
285 See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 2 (3d ed. 2003)
(“President Roosevelt, personally, would attribute to the Pecora hearings a decisive role in mak-
ing possible the legislation of the First Hundred Days of his administration.”). For discussion of
the repeal of Glass-Steagall, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Road to Repeal of the Glass-Stea-
gall Act, 17 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 441, 444 (2017).
286 See generally A.W. MULLINEUX, BUSINESS CYCLES AND FINANCIAL CRISES (2011),
https://hvtc.edu.vn/Portals/0/files/635826563558646918business-cycles-and-financial-crises.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AM7Y-9BF3].
287 See Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why
Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173,
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firm and “Wall Street fortress for most of the twentieth century,” rose
to new prominence with the change.288 Michael Lewis’s 1989 book
Liar’s Poker captured the new Wall Street culture and the celebration
of what he called the “big swinging dick.”289 Lewis described this well-
paid class of traders, hired right out of Ivy League colleges, as acting
“more like students in a junior high school.”290 This ethos combined a
glorification of cleverness and gamesmanship with “sign[s] of . . . mas-
culinity.”291 In this environment, Salomon Brothers’ management style
became “one of warring individuals and factions.”292 Serving custom-
ers was not part of the path toward advancement.293 The firm created
complex, opaque financial products and sought to profit from them at
the expense of less sophisticated customers.294 Traders bragged about
“blowing up a client,” or persuading the client to buy a product cer-
tain to decline in value and then forcing the client out of the market.295
Potential clients who were often at the losing ends of these trades
nonetheless sought to be associated with the winners of these high-
stakes status competitions.296 “Winning”—and the size of the bonus at
the end of the year—is what mattered in the hothouse investment cul-
ture that came to dominate Wall Street.297
1177–78 (2010); cf. Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections
on the Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1408–09 (1992)
(reflecting on the role of limited liability for shareholders generally as increasing the willingness
to take risks).
288 Carrie Hojnicki, The Spectacular Rise and Fall of Salomon Brothers, BUS. INSIDER (July
3, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/salomon-brothers-treasury-bond-scandal-
2012-7?op=1/#lomon-brothers-was-founded-in-1910-1 [https://perma.cc/P8D5-P4H4].
289 MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER 46 (1989).
290 Id. at 98.
291 Id. at 99; see also Christine Sgarlata Chung, From Lily Bart to the Boom-Boom Room:
How Wall Street’s Social and Cultural Response to Women Has Shaped Securities Regulation, 44
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 175, 177 (2010) (describing the trading desk as “a highly competitive and
male-dominated environment where posters of pinup girls and strip club outings were not un-
heard of”).
292 Richard L. Stern, Book and Business; Overpaid and Guilt-Ridden, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29,
1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/29/books/book-business-overpaid-and-guilt-ridden.html
[https://perma.cc/H3RL-FDEK] (reviewing LEWIS, supra note 289). R
293 HILL & PAINTER, supra note 34, at 102–03 (describing Goldman Sachs’s practices of
fleecing its customers and noting that neither the individual trader’s nor the bank’s reputation
was necessarily hurt by being associated with this conduct so long as the behavior was associated
with the “smartest” bankers).
294 See id. at 85–86, 90 (describing the perceived connection among “cleverness” and “win-
ning,” sophisticated products, and appetite for risk).
295 See LEWIS, supra note 289, at 204.
296 See HILL & PAINTER, supra note 34, at 19 (indicating the emphasis on selling the most
complex products to the least sophisticated parties).
297 Id. at 85–86, 107.
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Salomon’s downfall came in the 1990s when it too egregiously
broke the law. Paul Mozer, a Salomon trader, tried to reap extra prof-
its for the firm by effectively “‘cornering’ the market” in government
securities, allowing the firm to “command[] a premium price” from
other brokers who could then obtain the bonds only from Salomon
Brothers.298 To combat the practice, the Treasury Department adopted
new rules limiting the percentage of the bonds any one buyer could
purchase.299 Mozer responded by submitting bids under his customers’
names, thus disguising Salomon’s stake in the purchases.300 Mozer told
Salomon’s management that he had faked the bids, but management,
who had been informed that Mozer’s actions were illegal and needed
to be reported, did nothing for months.301 By then, Treasury had fig-
ured it out, triggering a crisis that forced the resignation of Salomon’s
top management.302 The firm ultimately paid a $290 million fine to the
SEC, one of the largest fines ever issued against an investment bank at
the time.303
The crisis at Salomon Brothers is striking in many respects and
illustrates the break-the-rules culture. Mozer’s violations of the law
were almost certainly prompted by hubris; he sought to circumvent a
Treasury that he believed, probably correctly, was aimed at him.304
Treasury is likely to have discovered and pursued the violation be-
cause it was an act of defiance, one that undermined the integrity of
the entire Treasury bond market. In the meantime, Salomon higher-
ups saw no reason to take action even after Mozer told them he had
faked bids in the name of clients who knew nothing about his actions
and who stood to lose from what he had done.305 While the criminal
violations had consequences—Mozer spent four months in jail and the
stars of Liar’s Poker lost their jobs306—it did not fundamentally
298 Robert J. McCartney, Salomon Says Trader Challenged Treasury, WASH. POST (Sept. 5,
1991), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1991/09/05/salomon-says-trader-chal
lenged-treasury/149ea8f3-5155-4ba0-bc6f-95e8d647329e/?utm_term=.0891ae0b0a43 [https://
perma.cc/QC6F-CC9M].
299 Id.
300 See id.
301 Id.
302 Stephen Labaton, Salomon to Pay Phony-Bid Fine of $290 Million, N.Y. TIMES (May
21, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/21/business/salomon-to-pay-phony-bid-fine-of-290-
million.html [https://perma.cc/9PCF-FM9K].
303 Id.
304 See Bernice Kanner, Saving Solomon, N.Y. MAG., Dec. 9, 1991, at 42.
305 See Deborah A. DeMott, The Stages of Scandal and the Roles of General Counsel, 2012
WIS. L. REV. 463, 478–82 (describing how Mozer told his superiors about his fake bids and how
they failed to restrict his activities).
306 See Keith Bradsher, Former Salomon Trader to Pay $1.1 Million Fine, N.Y. TIMES (July
41893-gwn_87-5 Sheet No. 66 Side A      01/29/2020   09:32:14
41893-gwn_87-5 Sheet No. 66 Side A      01/29/2020   09:32:14
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\87-5\GWN505.txt unknown Seq: 43 24-JAN-20 10:03
2019] WOMEN, RULE-BREAKING, AND THE TRIPLE BIND 1147
change Wall Street culture.307 One account concluded it was part of a
more general shift “from a context of relationships to a context of
transactions.”308
By the time of the more recent housing bubble and financial crisis
that followed, Goldman Sachs (“Goldman”) had replaced Salomon
Brothers as the darling of Wall Street.309 The most lucrative part of
finance had long since shifted from servicing clients to designing and
selling complex financial instruments, such as the mortgage-backed
collateralized debt obligations that precipitated the financial crisis.310
Greg Smith, a Goldman Vice President who left in 2012, explained
that Goldman’s practices had a lot in common with those Salomon
Brothers pioneered in the 1980s: “[G]etting an unsophisticated client
was the golden prize. The quickest way to make money on Wall Street
is to take the most sophisticated [financial] product and try to sell it to
the least sophisticated client.”311 The stars in the new show were those
who made the most money, and they tended to be those who created
and sold the most opaque instruments for the highest markups.312
With the housing boom in the early 2000s, this fueled increasing de-
mand for new mortgages that could be converted into securities and
fueled a wave of predatory practices.313
Mortgage brokers, who earned commissions on every mortgage
loan issued, encouraged buyers to purchase homes the mortgage bro-
kers knew these buyers could not afford, often without accurately dis-
15, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/15/business/former-salomon-trader-to-pay-1.1-mil
lion-fine.html [https://perma.cc/8JNC-PNB3].
307 The remaining Salomon brokers merged with Smith Barney in the 1990s, became part of
Citigroup after the repeal of Glass-Steagall, then oversaw Citi’s ventures into mortgage-backed
financial products during the housing bubble. See HILL & PAINTER, supra note 34, at 84, 99. Citi
eventually paid seven billion dollars to settle federal and state claims arising from its involve-
ment in mortgage related securities. Nate Raymond, Exclusive: Citigroup Executives Avoid U.S.
Charges over Mortgage Bonds—Document, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2016, 12:34 PM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-citigroup-mbs-idUSKCN0W626D [https://perma.cc/7DSU-2E43]. A
Federal Housing Finance Agency inspector general report found that “Citigroup knowingly and
purposefully purchased and securitized loans that did not meet representation and warranties or
in many cases were outright fraudulent loans.” Id.; see also HILL & PAINTER, supra note 34.
308 Neal Lipschutz, Moral Outrage Attends the Probe of the U.S. Bond-Market Scandal,
BALT. SUN (July 11, 1993), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1993-07-11/news/1993192091_1_salo
mon-government-bonds-martin-mayer [https://perma.cc/3UTC-BE4M].
309 See HILL & PAINTER, supra note 34, at 102.
310 See id. at 5, 82–84 (describing investment banks’ move from brokerage activities and
underwriting corporate securities to designing and trading new securities on their own accounts).
311 Id. at 19.
312 Id. at 102.
313 See id. at 2.
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closing the terms of the mortgages.314 Predatory lending practices
were commonplace.315 The mortgage originators then bundled the
loans and sold them to investment banks, which repackaged them into
complex securities that disguised the level of risk.316 Rating agencies
gave the securities Triple A ratings, often without reviewing the sup-
porting files and even when the file samples they reviewed indicated a
level of risk that belied the ratings.317 When the market began to col-
lapse, the institutions in a position to see the crisis coming protected
themselves by shortchanging their customers.318 At each of these
stages, sophisticated parties misrepresented the products they were
selling in ways that violated the rules (like standard underwriting
practices) that had governed home mortgages for decades.319 They
314 See Binyamin Appelbaum, How Mortgage Fraud Made the Financial Crisis Worse, N.Y.
TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/upshot/how-mortgage-
fraud-made-the-financial-crisis-worse.html [https://perma.cc/2APK-4JZF]; Wall Street’s Role in
the U.S. Mortgage Crisis Examined, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 20, 2008, 6:30 PM), https://
www.pbs.org/newshour/show/wall-streets-role-in-the-u-s-mortgage-crisis-examined [https://
perma.cc/6GK7-HWTC].
315 See Sumit Agarwal et al., Predatory Lending and the Subprime Crisis, 113 J. FIN. ECON.
29, 31 (2014). Lenders also charged struggling homeowners unjustified fees after the fact. See
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Countrywide Will Pay $108 Million for Overcharging Strug-
gling Homeowners; Loan Servicer Inflated Fees, Mishandled Loans of Borrowers in Bankruptcy
(June 7, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/06/countrywide-will-pay-108-
million-overcharging-struggling [https://perma.cc/A4LY-ED7X].
316 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN
THE UNITED STATES (2011), https://fcic.law.stanford.edu/ [https://perma.cc/SCP7-T6FP]. In some
cases, the mortgage bankers bought the bundled mortgages even when their employees warned
them of the lack of underwriting and substandard practices. See Terry Carter, Will Those Who
Led the Financial System into Crisis Ever Face Charges?, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 1, 2016, 5:10 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/will_those_who_led_the_financial_system_into_cri
sis_ever_face_charges [https://perma.cc/X9ER-EAM7].
317 See Claire Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime Securi-
ties?, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 585, 591–92 (2010).
318 Jeff Madrick & Frank Partnoy, Should Some Bankers Be Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Nov. 10, 2011, at 23, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2011/11/10/should-some-bankers-
be-prosecuted/ [https://perma.cc/G6ZD-ZWE2]; see also HILL & PAINTER, supra note 34, at 3
(observing that Goldman Sachs “apparently reduced its own risk by selling part of its mortgage
exposure to its clients and customers”).
319 See, e.g., STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOME-
LAND SEC. AND GOV’T AFFAIRS, 112TH CONG. REP. ON WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE (2011) (providing case studies on several institu-
tional investment banks that misrepresented to clients information about their packages); Wil-
liam Black, Oral Testimony of William K. Black, NEW ECON. PERSP. (Feb. 8, 2015), http://
neweconomicperspectives.org/2015/02/oral-testimony-william-k-black.html [https://perma.cc/
6TLS-HYGC].
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often deliberately targeted the vulnerable and bragged about it while
reaping handsome rewards for their rule-breaking.320
The SEC’s civil securities fraud case against Goldman illustrates
these abuses.321 In 2010, the SEC announced that Goldman would pay
a $550 million fine (the largest the SEC had secured up to that time)
to settle charges that “Goldman misled investors in a subprime mort-
gage product just as the U.S. housing market was starting to col-
lapse.”322 The SEC also decided to bring individual civil fraud charges
against “the lowest man on the totem pole,” a young, “midlevel
Goldman trader” and French citizen named Fabrice Tourre.323 Tourre
had made the mistake of joking about his role in the crime. In an
email to his girlfriend, he boasted that he sold toxic mortgage bonds to
“widows and orphans that I ran into at the airport,”324 though in fact
the customers were more sophisticated and more targeted than the
email suggested.325 In a different email, he wrote, “The whole building
is about to collapse anytime now . . . Only potential survivor, the
fabulous Fab . . . standing in the middle of all these complex, highly
leveraged, exotic trades he created without necessarily understanding
all the implications of those monstrosities!!!”326 The SEC charged that
Tourre had “put together a complicated financial product that was
secretly designed to maximize the likelihood that it would fail, and
marketed and sold it to investors without appropriate disclosure.”327
When the deal unraveled as Goldman expected it would, investors
suffered about one billion dollars in losses.328 The investment banking
320 Even those who didn’t get away with these behaviors entirely pocketed large sums of
money they never had to pay back. See, e.g., Madrick & Partnoy, supra note 318, at 23 (describ-
ing how fines the SEC levied against Mozilo paled in comparison with the profits he made in a
single year of his mortgage operations).
321 See, e.g., Complaint at 7–11, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010) (No. 10-CV-3229); see also Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?,
61 DUKE L.J. 511 (2011).
322 See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550
Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), https://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm [https://perma.cc/L2Z8-PHK9]. For an account of
the failure to prosecute these activities, see Jesse Eisinger, Why the S.E.C. Didn’t Hit Goldman
Sachs Harder, NEW YORKER (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/
why-the-s-e-c-didnt-hit-goldman-sachs-harder [https://perma.cc/BPR3-9T3F].
323 Eisinger, supra note 322.
324 Sam Gustin, Not So ‘Fabulous’ Fab: Ex-Goldman Sachs Trader Fabrice Tourre Found
Liable for Fraud, TIME (Aug. 1, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/08/01/not-so-fabulous-fab-
ex-goldman-sachs-trader-found-liable-for-fraud// [https://perma.cc/GEK8-P42X].
325 See Buell, supra note 321, at 513 (describing the customer as a German bank).
326 Gustin, supra note 324.
327 Id.
328 Ben Protess, Former Goldman Trader Tourre Says He Will Not Appeal, N.Y. TIMES:
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firm, however, “made millions of dollars in fees on the deal,” and
Tourre received $1.7 million from Goldman in the year the project
went through.329 Goldman’s excuse was caveat emptor—the fine print
in its disclosure clearly said that Goldman assumed no responsibility
for the success of the securities it created and sold.330 Goldman settled
its case with the SEC, but Tourre lost at trial; he ended up paying
more than $800,000 in fines, though Goldman did pick up the tab for
his legal fees.331
The cases brought against Mozer and Tourre are rare in targeting
individuals for financial misconduct in environments where such ac-
tions are commonplace. Even then, higher-ups in a position to know
about and profit from their activities were not charged in the individ-
ual actions. At the same time, the whistleblowers who tried to warn
against Wall Street’s excesses often now find themselves unemploya-
ble in the industry.
B. Compensation and Conflicts of Interest: Why Environments
Hostile to Customers Favor Men
Wealth management and personal financial advisers are in a
somewhat different position from traders and investment bankers.
Unlike the latter, they have fiduciary obligations to their clients,332
and they are more likely to enter into ongoing, personalized relation-
ships with many clients.333 Nonetheless, these advisers are lightly regu-
lated at best, and critics conclude that “[t]he regulatory structure for
financial advice now tolerates incentives motivating financial advisors
to manipulate and deceive retail investors.”334
The most obvious conflicts arise from the fee structure. Benjamin
Edwards observes that “[c]ommission compensation structures may
lead even well-meaning financial advisors to recommend unwise in-
DEALBOOK (May 27, 2014, 4:49 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/27/former-goldman-
trader-tourre-says-he-will-not-appeal/ [https://perma.cc/Z224-FTXT].
329 Gustin, supra note 324.
330 See Madrick & Partnoy, supra note 318, at 25.
331 Gustin, supra note 324; Protess, supra note 328.
332 See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 439
(2010) (describing the increasingly blurry line between financial advisors who owe fiduciary obli-
gations and brokers who do not); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVIS-
ERS AND BROKER-DEALERS (2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZRE7-PA3Q].
333 See Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should Be
Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 756 (2012) (documenting that brokerage firms have long
advertised they provide personalized advice).
334 Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181 (2017).
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vestments to their clients.”335 These advisors may be tempted to steer
their clients toward products that offer higher sales commissions or
involve greater advisor involvement, generating higher fees.336 The
consequent losses for ordinary savers are estimated at $17 billion per
year.337
These conflicts may be exacerbated in large institutions when fi-
nancial advisers experience pressure to sell the bank’s other products.
Wells Fargo, for example, was caught up in a major scandal because its
employees “opened millions of ‘ghost’ bank and credit card accounts
for existing customers.”338 Out of fear for their jobs and because of
pressure to sell additional bank products, these employees, “with their
supervisors’ acquiescence, [] created accounts without the customers’
consent,” often targeting Native American tribes, undocumented re-
sidents, and other vulnerable customers unlikely to complain.339
The customers ended up not only paying for services they did not
want, but also being “charged for insufficient funds or overdraft fees
because there wasn’t enough money in their original accounts” to
cover the charges.340 One of the former Wells Fargo bankers com-
mented, “The analogy I use was that it was like lions hunting
zebras . . . . They would look for the weakest, the ones that would put
up the least resistance.”341 Another explained that “the whole founda-
tion of Wells Fargo is cross-sell, cross-sell, cross-sell.”342 And Wells
Fargo was not alone in these practices.343
These abuses provide insights into women’s difficulties in finance.
Incentive-based compensation systems do not just provide incentives
to work harder. They also encourage earning larger salaries at the cus-
335 Id. at 183.
336 See id. at 184 & n.12.
337 See id. at 184.
338 Claire A. Hill, Repugnant Business Models: Preliminary Thoughts on a Research and
Policy Agenda, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973, 975 (2017).
339 Id. at 976.
340 Jim Nortz, The Anatomy of a Corporate Scandal Unauthorized Credit Cards, Greasy
Cup Holders and a Surefire Recipe for a Corporate Scandal, Jan./Feb. 2017, 35 ASS’N CORP.
COUNS. DOCKET, at 71.
341 Merric Kaufman, “Lions Hunting Zebras”: The Wells Fargo Fake Accounts Scandal and
Its Aftermath, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 434, 438 (2017).
342 Nortz, supra note 340, at 72. “Cross-selling” refers to “the bank’s sales approach of
offering customers with a checking account many other types of products—including credit
cards, home loans, and lines of credit.” Id.
343 Forty other medium to large banks encouraged their employees to create millions of
fake accounts to meet sales goals. Matt Egan, Wells Fargo Isn’t the Only Bank with Fake Ac-
counts, Regulators Say, CNN BUS. (June 6, 2018, 1:56 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/06/
news/companies/wells-fargo-fake-accounts-banks-occ/index.html [https://perma.cc/B935-DBY9].
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tomer’s expense.344 Reports on the shortage of women in financial ad-
vising find that the compensation system is a factor in discouraging
women, but these studies do not say whether women are discouraged
by a failure to earn more or a refusal to do what it takes to short-
change clients.345 What is nonetheless clear is that those women who
make it into the profession experience the largest wage gap of any
employment category in the economy.346
At Wells Fargo, for example, complaints about selling customers
short have tended to dovetail with complaints about sexism.
Whistleblowers have complained that, for years, financial advisers in
the bank’s wealth management division were pressured to steer
wealthy clients into services that generated higher fees, even though
these services often carried higher risks and were not necessarily ap-
propriate for the client’s investment objectives.347 Justice Department,
SEC, and Labor Department investigations are pending.348 More re-
cently, women in the same division have complained about a glass
ceiling blocking them from promotion into the unit’s top ranks.349
Twelve out of the 45 regional managers in the wealth management
division are women.350 Yet, all seven of the senior managing directors
344 See Edwards, supra note 334, at 183 (arguing that such compensation systems create
intrinsic conflicts of interests in financial advising).
345 See CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER BOARD, supra note 273, at 21. Carol Gilligan’s
classic work suggests that gendered female behaviors involve greater attention to personal rela-
tionships. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Women’s Conception of Self and of Morality
(1982), in THE FUTURE OF DIFFERENCE (Hester Eisenstein & Alice Jardine eds., 1985); see Ni-
obe Way, Alisha Ali, Carol Gilligan & Pedro Noguera, Introduction: The Crisis of Connection, in
THE CRISIS OF CONNECTION: ROOTS, CONSEQUENCES, AND SOLUTIONS 1, 6–7 (Way et al. eds.,
2018) (exploring Gilligan’s paradigm-shifting recognition of connection).
346 Thompson, supra note 276.
347 Emily Glazer, Whistleblowers Detail Wells Fargo Wealth Management Woes, WALL
STREET J. (July 27, 2018, 4:14 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/whistleblowers-detail-wells-
fargo-wealth-management-woes-1532707096?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/8GLY-
LW8Y].
348 Matt Egan, Wells Fargo in Talks to Settle SEC, DOJ Fake-Account Investigations, CNN
BUS. (Mar. 1, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/01/business/wells-fargo-justice-de
partment-sec-settlement/index.html [https://perma.cc/JT9Q-JQ6E]; Emily Glazer, Justice De-
partment Widens Wells Fargo Sales Investigation to Wealth Management, WALL STREET J. (Mar.
16, 2018, 6:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-widens-wells-fargo-sales-in
vestigation-to-wealth-management-1521215076 [https://perma.cc/FG6J-XRNP].
349 See Emily Glazer, At Wells Fargo, Discontent Simmers Among Female Executives,
WALL STREET J. (Aug. 31, 2018, 10:53 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/at-wells-fargo-discon
tent-simmers-among-female-executives-1535707801 [https://perma.cc/H4K8-G6JZ].
350 Id.
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above them are men.351 The 12 women have alleged gender bias in the
promotion opportunities.352
Substantial evidence exists that women face the same triple bind
in finance that they do elsewhere. As suggested above, it may be
harder to find women eager to sell out their customers.353 Sallie
Krawcheck, after all, was fired not once but twice for her unwilling-
ness to push the kind of cross-selling that got Wells Fargo into so
much trouble.354 Initial reports suggested she had too intensely tan-
gled with the new Citi CEO at the height of the financial crisis.355
More detailed reports indicated they disagreed not just about protect-
ing Citi’s investment clientele from losses involving ill-advised mort-
gage products.356 The new CEO Pandit wanted Citigroup investment
advisers to “push largely Citigroup products,” while Krawcheck
thought the advisors she supervised “should be free to pitch products
from a variety of other companies” better suited to their clients’
needs.357 That same lack of devotion to cross-selling is what cut short
her tenure at BofA.358 Pitching Citi or BofA products is not the same
as opening bank accounts without the customer’s permission.359 How-
ever, putting customer interests ahead of the bank’s bottom line ap-
pears to be disqualifying for higher financial management positions.
When Krawcheck later mused that perhaps women did see the world
differently, what she almost certainly meant in emphasizing women’s
greater focus on relationships is that they are more like old-time (and
exclusively male) bankers; they believe that the job ought to be about
looking out for their customers’ interests.360
Women also face difficulties if they try to play the game the same
way men do.361 Allison Schieffelin, for example, filed a sex discrimina-
tion suit against Morgan Stanley in 2004.362 She maintained that
351 Id.
352 Id.
353 See supra text accompanying note 343.
354 See supra text accompanying notes 12–22.
355 See Fabrikant, supra note 12.
356 Id.
357 Id.
358 See Touryalai, supra note 15.
359 See Edwards, supra note 334.
360 See HILL & PAINTER, supra note 34, at 101; Roberts, supra note 20.
361 See, e.g., Joann S. Lublin, Women Managers Have Little Margin for Error, WALL
STREET J. (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/women-managers-have-little-margin-for-
error-1539966227 [https://perma.cc/C38S-3MSH].
362 Complaint of Plaintiff-Intervenor Allison Schieffelin at 1, EEOC v. Morgan Stanley &
Co., 324 F. Supp. 2d 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 01 CV 8421 (RMB)).
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“whereas male colleagues were praised for being aggressive and com-
petitive, . . . she was criticized for being ‘snippy’ and ‘too emo-
tional.’”363 When she did not do as well as the men around her, her
supervisor told her she “‘shouldn’t be so focused on Morgan Stanley,’
and she should instead direct her energy toward ‘the important things
in life’ like ‘having a family.’”364 Morgan Stanley excluded her from
the social events, retreats, and strip club outings that facilitated male
bonding with clients,365 and when she threatened to file suit, the firm
retaliated.366 Morgan Stanley eventually paid $54 million to settle her
case, with $12 million to Schieffelin personally.367
Even though women engage in misconduct much less than men,
women face the worst challenges when they do break the rules and
their bosses need scapegoats. John Mack, the boss and mentor who
fired Zoe Cruz, is also the one who insisted she more heavily involve
Morgan Stanley in riskier securities.368 Studies indicate that the worst
time for women in competitive systems is during downturns.369
A 2016 study of personal financial advisors documents the risks
women face. That study found that “[r]oughly 7% of financial advisors
[in the U.S.] have a past record of misconduct”370—a remarkably high
number for any industry, and one that suggests that misconduct is rife.
The study found that male advisors are more than three times as likely
to engage in misconduct, and more than twice as likely to be repeat
offenders as their female counterparts.371 The offenses they commit
are much costlier for their employers to settle. Once the misconduct is
reported, though, the female advisors are 20% more likely to be fired,
and 33% less likely to find a new job in the industry compared to the
men.372 The study also found Wells Fargo was one of the worst per-
formers. The bank was 25% more likely to fire women than men for
misconduct.373
363 Chung, supra note 291, at 231. R
364 Id.
365 Id.
366 Id.
367 Id. at 233.
368 See supra INTRODUCTION.
369 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
370 Mark L. Egan, Gregor Matvos & Amit Seru, When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Stan-
dard in Punishing Misconduct 2 n.2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23242,
2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23242?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_
source=ntw [https://perma.cc/4GSA-7AJ8].
371 Id. at 8.
372 Id. at 12.
373 Id. at 14; see also Annalyn Kurtz, Wells Fargo 25% More Likely to Punish Women Em-
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Additionally, the source of the complaints is different for men
and women. For men, customers initiate 57% of misconduct com-
plaints compared to 28% initiated by employers.374 For the women,
employer-initiated misconduct complaints are almost as common as
customer-initiated complaints (41% versus 48%), and employers initi-
ate more misconduct complaints against female employees (41%)
than against male employees (28%).375  The study cannot fully identify
the reasons for the gender disparities other than to note that the dis-
parities shrink in firms with more women owners.376 These findings
are consistent with other observations about why women do not do
well in finance. If the business model depends on shortchanging cus-
tomers, women do not do as well. They are less likely to view cynically
racking up unnecessary commissions as a sport; their customers may
be less forgiving if they do not live up to stereotypes about how wo-
men provide more selfless services; and employers who benefit from
the additional fees may be less inclined to back women who generate
customer complaints.377 Being able to shortchange customers or other-
wise break the rules requires supervisor support, and men in finance
are more likely to be in that position than women.378 Former trader
Maureen Sherry explains “‘[g]ood producers’ tend to be arrogant and
entitled, and also immunized from discipline. ‘The rainmakers don’t
get fired, ever, for bad behavior.’”379 The result creates reinforcing
tendencies in which the Goldman traders who most egregiously sell
out their customers enjoy greater fame and fortune than those who do
so by simply following orders.
The major investment banking firms may, in spirit, have much in
common with Enron and Uber. Salomon Brothers sought to disrupt
what was a relatively staid investment banking environment and re-
cruited traders who would thrive in a no-holds-barred business that
ployees than Men, Study Says, FORTUNE (Mar. 13, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/13/wells-
fargo-financial-advisers-gender-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/FSG9-XB6T] (describing Wells
Fargo as producing some of the greatest gender disparities).
374 See Egan, Matvos & Seru, supra note 370, at 8–9.
375 Id. at 9.
376 Id. at 4–5.
377 “Women’s workplace weaknesses are overplayed or punished excessively, while men’s
shortcomings often are ignored . . . .” Lublin, supra note 361.
378 Id.
379 Michael Hiltzik, Wall Street and High-Tech Sex Harassment Scandals Offer a Lesson for
Hollywood: Change Won’t Happen Quickly, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017, 5:25 PM), https://
www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-harassment-hollywood-20171027-story.html
[https://perma.cc/9NY8-LT9Y].
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rewarded cleverness and success.380 Personal financial advisers, how-
ever, are supposed to be different. They have longer-term customers
with ongoing and more personal relationships.381 Yet, the intrinsic
conflicts of interest and the commission- and fee-based compensation
system produces similar results.382 Winning is what matters, and those
who excel at “Liar’s Poker”—the ability to lie, bluff, cheat, and win—
are still the stars of Wall Street.383
IV. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW CANNOT REACH THE TRIPLE BIND
The types of discriminatory behavior that form the triple bind
posed above are virtually unreachable through legal doctrines in the
employment discrimination realm. Moreover, it is hard to argue that
the objective of antidiscrimination law should be to claim that women
should be equally able to join men in breaking the law at the expense
of others. Turn to Wal-Mart and consider two options. The first is al-
lowing a nationwide class action that would compel hiring more fe-
male managers, but otherwise leaving Wal-Mart’s labor practices
intact. The result might be an increase in the number of female man-
agers who succeed in stealing the wages of their primarily female em-
ployees. The second is strictly sanctioning Wal-Mart for wage theft
and threatening the company with draconian sanctions for new viola-
tions. While the first option might lead to a few more female manag-
ers, the second would give Wal-Mart a greater incentive to hire
women—and to dismantle the practices that discourage women from
applying.384
380 HILL & PAINTER, supra note 34, at 98–99.
381 Larry Roth, Fee or Commission-Based Service: What Kind of Relationship Should You
Have with Your Financial Advisor?, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2016, 2:40 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/larryroth/2016/04/20/fee-or-commission-based-service-what-kind-of-relationship-should-
you-have-with-your-financial-advisor/#1e6ec5d71749 [https://perma.cc/5NKQ-6CLM].
382 See HILL & PAINTER, supra note 34, at 97.
383 Id.
384 Bradley Keoun & Anders Keitz, The Goldman Sachs Board Remains Old Boys’ Club
Even as Rivals Promote Women, STREET (May 1, 2018, 3:24 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/
investing/as-companies-add-more-women-to-boards-goldman-sachs-keeps-a-pair-14574319
[https://perma.cc/SK4U-SGQ6] (“The thesis that a higher percentage of female directors can
improve corporate performance is supported by an organization called the 30% Club,” which
includes “the money managers BlackRock Inc. [], State Street Corp. [], Vanguard Group,” and
“Warren Buffett, the billionaire CEO of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.”); see also Kristin N. Johnson,
Banking on Diversity: Does Gender Diversity Improve Financial Firms’ Risk Oversight?, 70 SMU
L. REV. 327, 332 (2017) (surveying empirical literature regarding gender diversity and risk man-
agement and concluding that gender diversity on boards leads to better risk management
decisions).
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The impact would be much greater with both limits on executive
compensation and gender equity in its distribution.385 In the alterna-
tive, consider what accurate sex discrimination claims would look like.
The first leg of this oppressive triad is that men are succeeding
through narcissistic, self-interested behaviors. Corporations hand-
somely reward characteristics that are the upsides of narcissism: cha-
risma, ability to influence (manipulate) people, and risk-taking. The
downsides of unethical conduct and backstabbing may be somewhat
unintended consequences.386 The primary difficulty of framing this as
a sex discrimination suit is that, although narcissism has both
gendered roots and consequences, it does not sharply differ between
the sexes. While in general men tend to be more narcissistic than wo-
men, there are many men who are not, and there are some females
who are.387 Competitive, self-aggrandizing behaviors may be linked to
gender (whether through socialization or biology or both), but the be-
havioral manifestations of narcissism occur in individuals and are not
inexorably tied to gender identity.388 Therefore, it is possible the law-
yers who brought the class action against Wal-Mart did not mention
wage theft because it changed the case from one based on gender to
one serving Wal-Mart’s (not entirely legitimate) business interests.389
The second leg of the triad is that women who act atypically for
their gender are punished. A wealth of psychosocial literature sup-
ports the phenomenon that both men and women suffer penalties for
their departures from gender norms.390 However, when women sue for
sex discrimination based on penalties for gender nonconformity, their
lawsuits typically involve employers imposing stereotypes on women
by, for example, sorting them into caregiving occupations.391 Although
allegations that an employer discriminated against an employee for
385 See generally T. Leigh Anenson & Donald O. Mayer, “Clean Hands” and the CEO:
Equity as an Antidote for Excessive Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 947 (2010).
386 See Emily Grijalva et al., Narcissism and Leadership: A Meta-Analytic Review of Linear
and Nonlinear Relationships, 68 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 1, 3–4 (2015).
387 See Emily Grijalva et al., Gender Differences in Narcissism: A Meta-Analytic Review,
141 PSYCHOL. BULL. 261, 262 (2015).
388 Id. at 263.
389 See supra Section II.A.
390 See, e.g., Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and Benevolent
Sexism as Complementary Justifications for Gender Inequality, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 109, 113
(2001); Paul Kivel, The Act-Like-a-Man Box, in MEN’S LIVES 148–50 (Michael S. Kimmel &
Michael A. Messner eds., 2007); Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 359,
389, 393–94 (2004).
391 See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003); see also Back v.
Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 126 (2d Cir. 2004).
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her failure to conform to sex stereotypes theoretically can establish a
viable Title VII claim,392 these suits are difficult to win even when
based on a specifically sex-coded employer action, such as grooming
standards.393 A lawsuit claiming that an employer’s rule has a dispa-
rate impact based on sex-stereotypic behavior is an unusual framing:
“Recent Supreme Court constraints on implicit bias and disparate im-
pact theories have been in the context of cases seeking class-wide re-
lief, whereas sex stereotyping theories have been successful mostly in
cases seeking individual relief.”394
At the same time, it is also hard to win a case based on disparate
treatment of wrongdoers. Ellen Pao for example, had at least some
jury members in her Silicon Valley sex discrimination case convinced
that she had been fired for the same personality flaws as many of the
men, but the jury still voted against her.395
The third leg of the triple bind—that when women ahead of them
are ousted from jobs or discriminated against in promotions, other
women get discouraged—is not something that is legally actionable, if
it is even calculable. Women become disheartened when they see
other women fail, and when they become aware of gender stereo-
types, they tend to internalize beliefs about their own abilities and
modify their career aspirations in negative ways.396 Moreover, any
claim that women simply do not want the jobs because they are de-
signed to appeal to the unscrupulous undercuts allegations of sex
discrimination.397
This triple bind—of narcissistic behaviors correlating inexactly
with gender, subtle discrimination against women who act atypically
for their gender, and women making career choices based on percep-
tions about group treatment—is a behavioral triad that antidiscrimina-
tion law cannot reach. Antidiscrimination law is at its weakest in
trying to remedy subjective biases.398 When subjectivity affects layers
of decisions and multiple decisionmakers as well as critical self-assess-
ments, disparate treatment law’s requirements—of intentional dis-
392 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
393 See, e.g., Jesperson v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004).
394 Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype Theory, 20
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 919, 925 (2016).
395 See Cahn, Carbone & Levit, supra note 31, at 426–27, 467, 473, 476.
396 See Shelley J. Correll, Constraints into Preferences: Gender, Status, and Emerging Career
Aspirations, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 93, 95–96, 100 (2004).
397 See EEOC v. Sears, 839 F.2d 302, 313–14, 322, 326 (7th Cir. 1988).
398 See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
780 (2006).
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criminatory treatment of a comparator and identification of a specific
business practice that has a statistically differential impact—are diffi-
cult to meet.399 Moreover, while companies can defend the search for
people who will ruthlessly pursue company goals as a business pur-
pose, maybe it is not a legitimate or necessary one.400 These actions
accordingly become meaningful only when they combine a repudia-
tion of break-the-rules practices with recognition of their impact in
perpetuating gender disparities.
CONCLUSION
When companies can break the rules and get away with it so long
as senior management enjoys plausible deniability, it pays to select for
the ruthless, narcissistic, and unprincipled. The negative consequences
become acceptable so long as the short-term gains are high.401 Adopt-
ing such practices in turn leads to hugely gendered consequences. The
resulting triple bind provides a lens on the winner-take-all features of
society, the economy, and corporate and political life. Women are the
canaries in the coal mine indicating that companies that flourish by
creating hostile environments for women have fundamental problems
that go well beyond their gender biases.
The ultimate success of women in the higher ranks of the econ-
omy depends not just on equal access—allowing women to act unethi-
cally, stab their colleagues in the back, and shortchange their
customers on the same terms as men. Instead, it depends on funda-
mental reforms. That solution requires both internal and external
rules, and rule enforcement. If rule-breaking is seen as illegitimate, it
cannot be a legitimate business purpose as a defense in a sex discrimi-
nation case.402
Women’s success depends on dismantling cultures where the
greatest rewards go to those who act with impunity. The ability to “get
away with it” stems from the combination of deregulation, weakening
the formal rules that constrain self-interested behavior, decriminaliza-
tion, the use of individual criminal sanctions waning over time, and
the weakening of enforcement agencies who might effectively chal-
399 See Cahn, Carbone & Levit, supra note 31, at 477–81; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3, 8 (2006) (discuss-
ing how “it may be difficult, if not impossible, for a court to go back and reconstruct the numer-
ous biased evaluations and perceptions that ultimately resulted in an adverse employment
decision”).
400 See Cahn, Carbone & Levit, supra note 31, at 481.
401 See Akerlof & Romer, supra note 45.
402 See Cahn, Carbone & Levit, supra note 31, at 481.
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lenge these practices before they get out of hand.403 In the Wal-Mart
context, for example, the store manager strategy pays off because of
the politically motivated evisceration of wages and hours enforce-
ment.404 Wal-Mart women as a whole would benefit greatly from en-
forcement of minimum wage laws both because they
disproportionately hold minimum wage jobs and because they are
likely to find greater opportunities to move into management in a sys-
tem that does not depend to the same degree on subterfuge.405
The #MeToo movement has called more attention to abusive cul-
tures. Most sexual harassers like Harvey Weinstein and Roger Ailes
oppress and exploit others in ways having nothing to do with sexual
harassment. Focusing attention on their abuses of women, which most
observers find to be intrinsically objectionable, helps make the related
abuses of power, which may not necessarily involve either sex or wo-
men, more visible. The #MeToo movement therefore has the potential
to spark a more general movement to reform the winner-take-all cul-
tures that have taken root in today’s culture. The shift away from
mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment represents one of the pos-
itive outcomes of #MeToo,406 although the “successes” and buyouts of
those accused of harassment show that breaking the rules still pays.
The easiest reforms to implement involve changes in compensa-
tion. Reductionist compensation systems that encourage single-
minded attention to the bottom line and subjective systems that allow
supervisors to create old boys’ networks both work to women’s disad-
vantage.407 In contrast, more holistic systems that look at performance
403 See William Black, Banks Should Welcome Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2011), https://
www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/19/have-regulations-hurt-bank-profits/banks-should-
welcome-rules [https://perma.cc/36LU-NK97]. Black uses the term “desupervision,” which has
particular significance in the banking contexts where regulators have traditionally supervised
banks. See Black, supra note 30.  We describe instead the weakening of enforcement of all rules,
which had more general application.
404 LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 183, at 242.
405 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 370 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (not-
ing “[w]omen fill 70 percent of the hourly jobs in the retailer’s stores but make up only ‘33
percent of management employees’” (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137,
146 (N.D. Cal. 2004))).
406 Kate Conger & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Overhauls Sexual Misconduct Policy Af-
ter Walkout, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/08/technology/google-
arbitration-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/9KVW-R56V]; Daisuke Wakabayashi &
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Facebook to Drop Forced Arbitration in Harassment Cases, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/09/technology/facebook-arbitration-har-
assment.html [https://perma.cc/6THQ-EAX6] (noting Microsoft and Uber had previously done
away with arbitration in this context).
407 See, e.g., Marta M. Elvira & Mary E. Graham, Not Just a Formality: Pay System Formal-
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over longer periods work to women’s—and companies’—longer-term
advantages.408 This is particularly true in financial advising, where
rules that reinforce the identification between advisors and customers
have broad potential payoffs.409
Other solutions involve implementing more gender-diversity
friendly policies, with the carrot that this is correlated with higher
profitability410 and the stick of legal enforcement.411
The ultimate solutions, however, involve delegitimizing the mas-
culinity contests that take up too much of the energies of corporate
America.412 In this context, Michael Lewis’s suggested reforms of Wall
Street may have greater applicability. He wrote more colorfully than
most in 2014 that:
Men are more prone to financial risk-taking, and overconfi-
dence. . . . Trading is a bit like pornography: Women may like
it, but they don’t like it nearly as much as men, and they
certainly don’t like it in ways that create difficulties for soci-
ization and Sex-Related Earnings Effects, 13 ORG. SCI. 601, 601 (2002) (finding bonus pay sys-
tems produce more gender disparities than systems that give greater weight to base pay); Paul
Gompers et al., Gender Effects in Venture Capital 5 (May 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2445497 [https://perma.cc/K3JX-W6E4] (observing that women tend to
do better in more formal or “bureaucra[tic]” pay systems).
408 See, e.g., GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: HOW
OUR IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELL-BEING 59 (2010) (describing how iden-
tification with the company provides a superior form of motivation than monetary incentives);
DONALD HISLOP, KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT IN ORGANIZATIONS 230 (3d ed. 2013) (describing
how the most effective way to deal with problems like employee turnover is to develop institu-
tional identity and employee loyalty, and observing that institutional identity that encourages
employees to identify with firm objectives creates stronger loyalty than instrumental measures,
such as merit pay or bonuses); Lynn Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Con-
sequences of “Pay for Performance”, 39 J. CORP. L. 525, 533 (2014) (describing the counter-
productive effectives of modern executive compensation).
409 See Edwards, supra note 334, at 184–85 (proposing reforms for brokers and financial
advisors).
410 E.g., Vivian Hunt et al., Delivering Through Diversity, MCKINSEY & CO. (Jan. 2018),
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/our-insights/delivering-through-diver
sity [https://perma.cc/5RQK-4WWH]; Karsten Strauss, More Evidence That Company Diversity
Leads to Better Profits, FORBES (Jan. 25, 2018, 3:59 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/karsten
strauss/2018/01/25/more-evidence-that-company-diversity-leads-to-better-profits/#623712821bc7
[https://perma.cc/ZW5M-ZWLS].
411 See, e.g., David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update: Boards,
Sexual Harassment, and Gender Diversity, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REG. (Jan. 26, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/26/corporate-governance-update-
boards-sexual-harassment-and-gender-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/LJ42-CPYA].
412 In this sense, Kellye Testy’s emphasis in 2002 that the dialogue addressing corporate
reform must take place as part of a complex, interdisciplinary approach has proved prescient.
Kellye Y. Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social Movements, 76 TUL.
L. REV. 1227, 1251 (2002).
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ety. Put them in charge of all financial decision-making and
the decisions will be more boring, but more sociable.413
Greater sociability would promote more cooperative relation-
ships among coworkers, greater willingness to follow transparent rules
that apply to everyone, and greater respect for the customers compa-
nies purport to serve.414 No one should be able even to think about the
ability to shoot someone on Fifth Avenue and get away it.415
413 Michael Lewis, Eight Things I Wish for Wall Street, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2014, 5:00
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2014-12-15/michael-lewis-eight-things-i-wish-
for-wall-street [https://perma.cc/X5BF-K6AW].
414 Sue Shellenbarger, The Best Bosses Are Humble Bosses, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 9, 2018,
9:35 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-best-bosses-are-humble-bosses-1539092123 [https://
perma.cc/7B4S-ZFE3] (observing that companies that hire bosses who demonstrate honesty and
humility inspire closer teamwork, better performance, lower turnover, and less absenteeism).
Another study of 105 IT companies found greater humility in their CEOs was associated with
greater leadership; team integration; collaboration, and cooperation; and flexibility in strategic
orientation. Amy Y. Ou, David A. Waldman & Suzanne J. Peterson, Do Humble CEOs Matter?
An Examination of CEO Humility and Firm Outcomes, 44 J. MGMT. 1147 (2018).
415 See Reena Flores, Donald Trump: I Could “Shoot Somebody and I Wouldn’t Lose Any
Voters, CBS NEWS (Jan. 23, 2016, 3:37 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-i-
could-shoot-somebody-and-i-wouldnt-lose-any-voters/ [https://perma.cc/2YP7-FPNJ].
